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ABSTRACT  
 
The issue of pay equity within publicly-traded companies has been a question of 
growing interest in recent years. Academics, policy-makers, and members of the popular 
press and general public have become increasingly focused on the extent to which pay at 
the highest levels of American business exceeds that received by other workers. In fact, 
according to a recent study by Anderson, Cavanagh, Collins, & Benjamin (2006) the ratio 
of CEO pay to that of the average worker grew 380% from 107:1 in 1990 to 411:1 in 
2005.  
While growing attention has been paid to the distribution of pay across the 
hierarchy of corporations, the question of the distribution in pay within top management 
groups has gone little-studied. Yet, a growing cadre of researchers across multiple 
disciplines has yielded interesting insights into the antecedents and consequences of pay 
disparities in top management teams. With this dissertation I seek to spur further 
investigation into this strategically relevant phenomenon and to move the current debate 
beyond tournament theoretic explanations by showing that pay disparities within top 
management groups arise as a function of the distribution of power within them.  
This study is based on a sample of 604 publicly-traded firms drawn from the S&P 
1500 that served as the context in which a theoretical model linking sociopolitical factors 
in the top management group, top management group pay disparities, and subsequent 
financial performance was tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and 
structured equation modeling (SEM) techniques.  Results indicate that CEO power plays 
an important role in the distribution of compensation within top management groups and 
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the extent to which pay is disparate. Further, results show that top management group pay 
disparities have an economically relevant effect on subsequent financial performance. 
 The dissertation and its findings make some important contributions to the top 
manager compensation, managerial power, and corporate governance literatures by 
providing new insights into both the antecedents and consequences of top management 
disparities.  
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CHAPTER 1: INRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The compensation of top executives, particularly CEOs, has garnered significant 
attention over the past several decades. Scholars, policy-makers, and members of the 
popular press and general public have increasingly focused on the extent to which pay at 
the highest levels of American business exceeds that received by other workers. In fact, 
according to a recent report by Anderson et al. (2006) the ratio of CEO pay to that of the 
average worker grew 380% from 107:1 in 1990 to 411:1 in 2005.  
While public interest in CEO pay has fueled policy changes at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) regarding the disclosure of executive compensation, 
relatively little attention has been paid to pay inequity within firms, specifically that 
which exists within the top management group (“TMG”). Yet, not unlike the disparities 
between CEO pay and that of the average worker, the disparity between CEO pay and 
that of the highest ranking non-CEO members of TMGs has widened in the past few 
decades (Frydman & Saks, 2006). As was reported in a historical analysis of trends in 
executive compensation from 1936-2003, Frydman & Saks (2006) found that the 
disparity in pay between the CEOs of publicly-traded firms domiciled in the United 
States of America and the next two highest paid officers was fairly compressed during 
WWII. It increased incrementally until the 1970s, and exponentially thereafter. As of 
2003, the compensation of the average CEO of a large publicly-traded company as 
compared to the 3rd highest officer in the firm was 25% higher than it was early in the 
20th century, and 19% higher than it was in the 9-year period from 1990-1999 (Frydman 
& Saks, 2006). Citing the harmful effects of pay disparities in organizations, John 
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Mackey, the CEO of Whole Foods, offered that “fewer things harm an organization’s 
morale more than great disparities in compensation. When a workplace is perceived as 
unfair and greedy, it begins to destroy the social fabric of the organization” (Business 2.0, 
2007: 1). 
Defined as the vertical disparities that "exist when pay differs greatly between 
executive levels" (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005: 262), TMG pay disparities presents an 
interesting focus of investigation for strategic management researchers. Over the past few 
years, tournament theorists, organizational sociologists, and strategists (e.g. Conyon, 
Peck, & Sadler, 2001; Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993; Leonard, 1990; Main, 
O'Reilly, III, & Wade, 1993) have sought to identify both the antecedents and the 
performance implications of disparate pay within the TMG. What has emerged is an 
interesting, albeit somewhat puzzling, picture. On one hand, empirical work has 
documented both the presence of corporate tournaments in large publicly-traded firms 
and the use of disproportionately large pay differentials between CEO pay and that of the 
executives at the next highest level of the organization (Bloom & Michel, 2002; Conyon 
et al., 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001; Lambert et al., 1993; 
Leonard, 1990; Main et al., 1993).  
Conversely, investigation into the performance-related consequences of disparate 
TMG pay has yielded equivocal results. Pointing to the performance-enhancing 
characteristics of sequential elimination tournaments and the motivating effects of 
disproportionately large pay differentials, some researchers have documented 
performance-related benefits of relatively disparate pay (e.g. Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 
2001). And pointing to the negative consequences of relatively disparate pay, strategy 
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researchers and organization sociologists have shown that firm performance suffers 
(Bloom & Michel, 2002; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Conyon et al., 2001; Eriksson, 
1999; Leonard, 1990; Main et al., 1993; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005).  
The equivocal nature of empirical findings in this stream presents an opportunity 
to incorporate theoretical perspectives identified in related literatures. Hence, drawing on 
theories of managerial power and managerial discretion, this dissertation does two things. 
First, it explicates the sociopolitical antecedents of TMG pay disparities. Specifically, it is  
argued that the extent to which pay among the TMG is disparate is a function of the 
power of the incumbent CEO, the extent to which the firm environment conveys enough 
discretion to shape the distribution of compensation within the TMG, and the relative 
power of the non-CEO members of the TMG. This argument is based on two implicit 
assumptions: (1) compensation resources are finite in that they are theoretically bounded 
by the firm’s capacity to capture value from customers in the form of revenues; and, (2) 
that, ceterus paribus, individual TMG members will wish to consume more compensation 
resources rather than less. Additionally, I attempt to facilitate understanding of TMG pay 
disparity performance implications by (1) testing competing hypotheses based on both 
the economic and behavioral perspectives of TMG pay disparities, and (2) integrating the 
two perspectives in a test of a nonlinear effect (inverted-U).  
1.2. Research Questions and Expected Contributions 
In as much, the primary objective of this dissertation is to develop and test a 
theoretical model that links CEO power to TMG pay disparities, and TMG pay disparities 
to subsequent financial performance. With this broad objective in mind, the following 
fundamental questions will be addressed:  
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1) What sociopolitical factors influence the distribution in compensation 
within the TMG? 
2) Does the discretion conferred by the organization environment onto 
the incumbent CEO lead to wider distributions in compensation within 
the TMG? 
3) What are the performance implications of disparate TMG pay? 
In attempting to address these questions, I seek to contribute to the growing body 
of knowledge regarding the antecedents and performance implications of compensation at 
the TMG-level of publicly-traded firms. Further, I attempt to move the debate beyond 
extant economic explanations of disparate TMG pay to show that sociopolitical factors 
shape the distribution of compensation resources among TMG members in a way that has 
direct consequences for how the TMG functions and how the firm performs, as a result. I 
also attempt to show that, while powerful CEOs may have the capacity to shape the 
distribution of TMG compensation resources, the power to do so is not infinite. In as 
much, CEO power is argued to be mitigated by two factors: 1) the level of discretion 
conveyed by the firm; and, 2) the relative power of the non-CEO members of the TMG.  
The dissertation introduces several novelties. Specifically, the relative power of 
non-CEO members of the TMG has never been formalized theoretically or tested 
empirically. In as much, the dissertation develops a relative power construct that is new 
to the strategic management literature. The dissertation also contributes to the debate 
regarding performance by moving past the economic/behavioral dichotomy of 
explanations of financial performance by integrating the two perspectives theoretically 
and testing the relationship empirically. I also attempt to show that the context in which 
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TMG pay disparities exist will be (at least, partially) deterministic of the effect such 
disparities have on subsequent financial performance.  
1.3 Summary and Outline of the Study 
The dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2 I review the extant TMG pay 
disparities literature with a focus on the theoretical and empirical developments centering 
on both the antecedents and performance implications of TMG pay disparities. In chapter 
3 I develop a theoretical model that draws from this review and the associated managerial 
power and discretion literatures in order to develop a testable theoretical model. In 
chapter 4 I describe the methodology that is used to test the theoretical model that is 
developed in chapter 3. In chapter 5 I discuss the results of the study while in chapter 6 I 
discuss theoretical and practical implications and the contributions that are made to the 
extant body of work.  
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CHAPTER 2: LIERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter I establish a foundation upon which to develop and test a 
theoretical model that is used to predict TMG pay disparities and subsequent firm 
financial performance (in Chapter 3). Hence, this chapter will review and analyze the 
important theoretical and empirical developments in two streams of the TMG pay 
disparity literature. First, the review and analyses will focus on the theoretical 
foundations of TMG pay disparities and subsequent empirical developments. Next, the 
chapter will focus on performance-related consequences. The final section of this chapter 
will identify opportunities for potential contributions to this emerging literature. Upon 
completing a review of the relevant literature, chapter 3 introduces and develops the 
theoretical model and associated hypotheses.  
2.1 TMG Pay Disparities Research  
 With a foundation in labor economics and organizational sociology, research on 
the pay disparities in TMGs emerged in strategic management in the 1990s. As is 
common in an emerging literature there has been considerable diversity in both approach 
and research questions without the emergence of a systematic research paradigm. For 
example, the extant body of literature is replete with studies that have focused on the 
antecedents and performance-related consequences of pay disparities in a variety of 
organizational contexts ranging from academic departments (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) to 
professional sports teams (e.g. Frick, Prinz, & Winkelman, 2003; Jewell & Molina, 
2004), hospitals (e.g. Brown, Sturman, & Simmering), and broad organizational contexts 
comprised of multiple hierarchical levels (e.g. Conyon & Peck, 2001). While theoretical 
development and empirical findings in these areas are instructive, they are not directly 
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applicable to the strategic context of the TMG, a group of executives that occupy the apex 
of economic organizations. As empirical work in organizational sociology demonstrates, 
organizations of different sizes, structures, technologies, missions, and environments are 
often radically different (Carroll, 1984; Scott, 1995). For example, research on pay 
disparities in relatively flat structural contexts (e.g. sports teams and academic 
departments) is conducted in organizational environments that lack the complexity in 
reporting, control, and monitoring often found in large publicly-traded corporations. In 
such environments the control mechanism is more likely to be direct supervision or 
personal control on the part of the manager where coordination is achieved by mutual 
adjustment rather than by the bureaucratic processes that are found in taller 
organizational hierarchies (Carroll, 1984). In this sense, sports teams and academic 
departments may be seen more as contexts in which work groups function rather than as 
work organizations because the team or the department does not comprise the 
organization’s hierarchy as a whole but rather a small subset thereof.  
TMGs occupy the apex of complex hierarchical economic organizations. As such 
the appropriate context for the study of TMG pay disparities is publicly-traded firms 
directed toward profit-maximization activities for the benefit of their owners. Irrespective 
of the specificity of the aforementioned context, existing studies serve as the impetus for 
investigation of the TMG pay disparity phenomena. That research in this stream is 
subsequently reviewed.   
2.2 Antecedents of TMG Pay Disparities: Theoretical Foundations  
Although empirical investigation of TMG pay disparities is embryonic in strategic 
management, an established literature in neoclassical economics argues that such 
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disparities are attributable to the use of sequential elimination tournaments (e.g. Green & 
Stokey, 1983; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Malcolmson, 1984; Rosen, 1986). For several 
decades tournament theorists have sought to link sequential elimination tournaments with 
pay disparities while identifying their performance-related benefits.  
As a reduced form of agency theory, tournament theory is concerned with limiting 
the extent to which executives may divert firm resources from the profit-maximization 
goals of firm owners to achieve their own personal interests (e.g. higher levels of 
compensation, lower likelihood of involuntary turnover, longer tenures, etc.). Relevant to 
the context of the principal-agent relationship (e.g. Berle & Means, 1932, Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) in publicly-traded firms, the normative 
prediction of tournament theory is that widely disparate pay resulting from the use of 
sequential elimination tournaments has performance-related benefits that accrue to the 
firm's owners. According to tournament theory, principals wish to place those individuals 
capable of high levels of performance in the upper echelons of the firm because it is there 
that such executives may best shape the firm's strategies and impact performance levels 
(Lambert et al., 1993). For this task, firm owners desire ambitious and competitive 
executives. To this end, it is argued that firm owners create incentives for talented and 
motivated executives to invest in, and to commit their human capital to the profit-
maximization of the firm. Earning the right to do so is a function of the competition 
among tournament competitors that results in the winner securing the ultimate career 
prize-the title of CEO (Lambert et al., 1993; Leonard, 1990; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005).  
Rosen (1986) theorized that organizational compensation schemes are modeled as 
sequential elimination tournaments where compensation rewards increase 
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nonmonotonically with survival from one level of competition to another (see Figure 
2.2).  
Figure 2.2: Corporate Tournaments and the Competition for the CEO Title  
 
 
CEO
(level
n- n)
non-CEO TMG
(level n - (n +1)
Level n
Level n - 1
...
 
 
Theoretically, the tournament begins with 2n players and proceeds sequentially 
through N stages until the final match is won. In this sense, executives compete with one 
another at the nth level of the organization in order to achieve the promotion necessary to 
reach the next organizational level (n-1). Winning at level n provides the winner with the 
option to continue in the tournament while progressing, sequentially, to higher levels of 
the organization. While winners survive to the next round (n-1), competitors who do not 
win in any given round at level n obtain the present compensation for future periods and 
experience truncated career horizons (Lambert et al., 1993). Hence, it is theorized that 
this zero-sum characteristic of sequential elimination tournaments serves to motivate 
executives to continually high levels of achievement and success. 
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Unlike standard economic theory, which argues that individuals are paid 
according to their marginal product (Mahoney, 2005), compensation schemes based on 
sequential elimination tournaments yield situations in which executives at firms are paid 
as an increasing function of their location in the firm's hierarchical structure. In this 
sense, the internal labor market is one that rewards individual competitors not only as a 
function of their marginal productivity, but rather as a function of an individual's capacity 
to outperform other organizational competitors at a given hierarchical level. Winning  
results in receiving disproportionate increases in pay. For instance, a Vice President 
recently promoted to the Office of President on January 1, 2007 may receive a 
disproportionate increase in pay equivalent to five times (for example) the pay received 
as a Vice President just one day earlier. It is doubtful, however, that this same individual 
will have observed a concomitant increase in marginal product equivalent to the same 
multiple in that same day.  
Winning in any given round, n, is equivalent to a career progression option whose 
value shrinks over time with each successive win because each successive win results in 
fewer remaining rounds as the end of the tournament is approached (Lambert et al., 
1993). Rosen (1986) argues that unless top-ranking pay prizes (e.g. pay at the CEO level) 
are given a disproportionate weight in the purse of winnings, competitors that win in the 
final round of the tournament and attain the ultimate position (e.g. the title of CEO) will 
rest on their laurels and shirk because no subsequent promotion opportunity exists. 
Hence, disproportionately large pay differentials offered to the tournament’s winner will 
serve to motivate executives to continuously high levels of performance as if the 
tournament has no end (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). This argument is based on the explicit 
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assertion that because the value of the option associated with winning the tournament has 
a non-positive value that principals must find another mechanism that incorporates the 
"equivalence of the option" to continue-disproportionately large pay differentials to the 
CEO (Lambert et al., 1993: 440). In this sense, the potential to (continually) earn 
disproportionately large pay increases in the future motivates incumbent CEOs to 
compete and to achieve at relatively high levels over time. Because this feature offers 
continued incentives to executives who successfully reach and compete in the final stages 
of the tournament, theorists argue that compensation schemes based on rank-order 
tournaments are efficient in that they serve to promote the "quality of play" as they 
motivate capable executives to act in the best interests of the firm’s owners (Rosen, 1986: 
701).  
2.3 Antecedents of TMG Pay Disparities: Empirical Developments 
Much of the extant research has examined the normative performance-related 
implications of pay disparities among the TMG (a literature that will be reviewed later in 
this dissertation). A search of the literature on antecedents of TMG pay disparities 
identifies only a limited number of studies in industrial relations (e.g. Leonard, 1990), 
labor economics (Main et al., 1993), administrative sciences (e.g. Lambert et al., 1993), 
and strategic management (Conyon et al., 2001). While no systematic approach to 
analyzing this phenomenon is evident, several insightful and relevant findings have 
emerged (see table 2.1 for a summary). For example, empirical investigation has 
identified and documented the presence of tournaments that exhibit a convex relationship 
between hierarchical level in the organization and executive pay that is punctuated by a 
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disproportionately large pay differential between the CEO level and the next-lowest level 
in the corporate hierarchy.  
Table 2.3: Empirical Studies: Antecedents of TMG Pay Disparities 
Empirical 
Studies 
Sample Hypothesized 
Relationships 
Summary of Findings 
Leonard 
(1990) 
Private survey data 
of executive and 
managerial pay 
conducted between 
1981 and 1985 in 
439 of the largest 
U.S. corporations 
Hierarchical level 
executive pay; pay 
differentials an 
increasing function 
of hierarchical level
Tournament theory 
supported: (1) level in the 
corporate hierarchy is the 
most important predictor of 
executive pay; (2) pay 
differentials between 
hierarchical levels increase 
as a function of hierarchical 
level 
Lambert, 
Larcker, & 
Weigelt (1993) 
A private survey of 
303 large publicly-
traded U.S. 
corporations in the 
food, paper, 
chemical, 
machinery, 
electrical, 
transportation 
equipment, and 
instrumentation 
industries 
Hierarchical level 
executive pay; pay 
differentials an 
increasing function 
of hierarchical level
Tournament theory 
supported: the relationship 
between the level of 
executive compensation 
and hierarchical level is 
convex (e.g. increasing); 
the difference in 
compensation level for the 
CEO relative to the next 
lower position is 
disproportionately large 
relative to compensation 
changes between other 
levels 
Main, O'Reilly, 
III, & Wade 
(1993) 
Archival executive 
pay data from 147 
U.S. corporations 
from 1908 to 1984 
Hierarchical level 
executive pay; pay 
differentials an 
increasing function 
of hierarchical 
level; number of 
contestants (V.P.s) 
predicts the size of 
pay differentials 
Tournament theory 
supported: (1) pay 
dispersion is an increasing 
function of hierarchical 
level with pay differentials 
highest between the level 
of CEO and the next-lowest 
level; (2) size of the pay 
differential is associated 
with the number of 
contestants 
Conyon, Peck, 
& Sadler 
(2001) 
Sample of 100 of 
the 150 largest 
publicly-traded 
Companies in the 
U.K. covering 532 
Hierarchical level 
executive pay; 
number of 
contestants predicts 
the  
Tournament theory 
supported: executive pay is 
an increasing function of 
hierarchical level in the 
organization; the 
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individual 
executives in 1997-
1998 
size of pay 
differentials 
tournament prize varies 
with the number of 
contestants 
Hendrickson 
& Fredrickson 
(2001)  
Sample drawn fro 
the high-tech 
equipment, natural 
resources, 
chemicals, and 
conglomerates 
industries from 
1985 to 1990 
produced a 
database of 189 
firm years 
Behavioral and 
tournament 
perspectives set up 
as competing 
hypotheses. 
Predictors included 
(1) relatedness of 
firm's businesses, 
(2) # of firm's  
businesses, (3) 
R&D intensity, (4) 
capital intensity, 
(5) firm size, and  
(6) # ofV.P.s 
Tournament theory 
supported: CEO pay gap is 
positively associated with 
(1) the number of 
businesses in the firm's 
portfolio, (2) a firm's R&D 
activity, (3) extent of 
capital investment, and (4) 
firm size. Behavioral 
hypotheses generally not 
supported although a 
negative relationship was 
observed between the # of 
the firm's V.P.s and the 
CEO pay gap 
Bloom & 
Michel (2002) 
Sample of 460 
publicly-traded 
U.S. companies 
from 1992 to 1997 
Investment 
opportunities, 
environmental 
instability, and 
environmental 
munificence lead to 
higher levels of 
executive pay 
dispersion 
Partially supported: 
investment opportunities 
and environmental 
instability lead to higher 
levels of executive pay 
dispersion while 
environmental munificence 
influences pay dispersion 
in the opposite direction 
 
In an early investigation, Leonard (1990) used private survey data to examine the 
compensation structure of executives and managers in a sample of 439 of the largest 
publicly-traded U.S. corporations. Citing tournament theory as an explanation, pay 
differentials between corporate ranks were found to be greater at higher levels in the 
corporate hierarchy. Similarly, in an investigation of 147 U.S. corporations from 1980 to 
1984, Main et al. (1993) found that the ratio of pay between levels increases as 
executives move up the corporate hierarchy culminating with the CEO who enjoys a level 
of base pay (bonus and salary) some 141 % greater than that earned by executives in the 
next-lowest level of the corporate hierarchy. In addition to this main finding, the authors 
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found that the size of pay differentials increases with the number of contestants in the 
tournament (e.g. Vice Presidents). Examining private compensation data from the food, 
paper, chemical, machinery, electrical, transportation equipment, and instrumentation 
industries, Lambert et al. (1993) also found a convex relationship between the level of 
executive compensation and organizational level. They describe the difference in 
compensation level for the CEO relative to the next-lowest position in the hierarchy as 
"extraordinarily large relative to the changes in compensation levels observed at other 
points in the hierarchy" (Lambert et al., 1993: 453). And, in a recent investigation of 100 
United Kingdom stock market companies that included 532 executives, Conyon et al. 
(2001) found a convex relationship between executive compensation and hierarchical 
level. Again, and of note, is that this relationship is characterized by a large differential 
pay increase between the CEO and the next-lowest level in the corporate hierarchy. In 
fact, winning the corporate tournament was rewarded with a 60% pay increase in their 
sample. Additionally, Conyon et al. (2001) found that as the size of the corporate 
tournament grows in terms of the number of competitors, the disproportionate increase in 
the size of the prize is also consistent with modeling executive pay as a sequential 
elimination tournament.  
2.4 TMG Pay Disparities and Performance: Theoretical Foundations 
As was stated earlier, standard economic theory holds that individuals are paid 
according to their marginal products. Yet, as has been discussed, empirical findings have 
identified characteristics of sequential elimination tournaments-a convex relationship 
between hierarchical level and compensation that is punctuated by disproportionately 
large pay differentials at higher levels of the firm (Conyon et al., 2001; Lambert et al., 
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1993; Leonard, 1990; Main et al., 1993). According to tournament theory, the use of 
compensation schemes based on sequential elimination tournaments is efficiency-
maximizing in contexts where individuals occupy positions that make measuring their 
productive output costly. While this is the case with top executives in general, it is the 
case with the CEO of modern economic organizations, in particular. In as much, 
sequential elimination tournaments that are punctuated by disproportionately large pay 
differentials at the final stage of the tournament are theorized to act as a potential 
complement to the direct monitoring of individual agents in contexts that are otherwise 
characterized by potential agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These normative 
arguments ascribe performance-related benefits.  
In another stream, with its foundations in the organizational sociology literature, 
the use of competitive sequential elimination tournaments punctuated by 
disproportionately large pay differentials is potentially dysfunctional. Arguments 
developed in this stream are generally steeped in equity (e.g. Adams, 1963; Adams, 1965; 
Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Adams & Rosenblaum, 1962) and relative deprivation 
theories, which are based on Festinger's (1954) concept of the social comparison of 
rewards.  
Like the economic theorists who argue that individuals are paid according to their 
marginal product, equity theorists also argue that individuals in exchange relationships 
(e.g. principal and agent, manager and subordinate) must be rewarded according to the 
level of their individual contributions (Adams, 1965; Cowherd & Levine, 1992). 
However, equity theorists go on to assert that individuals in an organizational context will 
judge the fairness of their exchange relationships by comparing the balance of the 
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(perceived) ratio of their inputs (e.g. human capital, effort, etc.) to the intangible and 
tangible rewards they receive to that of their referent peers (Cowherd & Levine, 1992). 
Feelings of cognitive dissonance are theorized to obtain when individuals have cognitions 
about their input-reward ratios that stand "in obverse" to the input-rewards ratios of 
referent peers (Adams & Jacobsen, 1964: 19).  
Like equity theory, relative deprivation theory is a reduced form of distributive 
justice theory that is based on social comparisons. Unlike equity theory however, relative 
deprivation theory argues that individuals experience deprivation when they compare the 
rewards they, or their referent peers, receive to the rewards received by other individuals 
or referent peers as a result of comparisons made (vertically) between hierarchical levels 
(Cowherd & Levine, 1992). In support of the predictions of relative deprivation theory, 
Martin (1981, 1982) showed that lower-strata (e.g. frontline workers) organization 
members compare their rewards to those received by upper-strata members (e.g. top 
executives), and that perceived interclass inequity results in feelings of deprivation-
induced injustice. 
Moving beyond equity theory to predict behavioral responses caused by relative 
deprivation, it is theorized that individuals who experience deprivation will exhibit 
behaviors that reflect either optimistically or pessimistically on the prospect of change-
behaviors that can be directed externally to the social system to which the individual 
belongs. Empirical research that evaluates the responses that individuals have towards the 
external environment has shown that consequences are in fact dysfunctional. They 
include extreme behavior such as political protests, riots, and revolutions (e.g. Isaac, 
Mutran, & Stryker, 1980) in the broader social context. With the organizational context 
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consequences may include absenteeism, strikes, vandalism, and violence within the 
organizational context: all of which result in lower levels of organizational performance 
(e.g. Crosby, 1984; Staw, 1984). 
2.5 TMG Pay Disparities and Performance: Empirical Developments  
While a substantial body of work has accumulated regarding the effects of 
horizontal pay disparities in university settings, professional sports, and hospitals (e.g. 
Beaumont & Harris, 2003; Bloom, 1999; Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990; Frick, Prinz, & 
Winkelman, 2003; Jewell & Molina, 2004; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), and across the  
hierarchical structure of economic organizations (e.g. Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Shaw, 
Gupta, & Delery, 2002), empirical investigation designed to explicate performance-
related consequences of vertical pay disparities among the TMG has been sparse. What 
has emerged is a pattern of equivocal results (see Table 2.2 for a summary) whereas 
much of the evidence fails to support the normative predictions of either the economic or 
behavioral perspectives (e.g. Conyon et al., 2001; Leonard, 1990). In fact, while some 
empirical work conducted in labor economics (e.g. Eriksson, 1999) and strategy (e.g. 
Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001) supports the normative predictions of tournament 
theory other findings in organizational sociology and strategic management support the 
behavioral perspective (e.g. Siegel & Hambrick, 2005; Bloom & Michel, 2002; Carpenter 
& Sanders, 2004).  
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Table 2.5: Empirical Studies: Performance Consequences of TMG Pay Disparities  
Empirical 
Studies 
Sample Hypothesized 
Relationships 
Summary of Findings 
Leonard 
(1990) 
Private survey 
data of executive 
and managerial 
pay conducted 
between 1981 
and 1985 in 439 
of the largest 
U.S. corporations 
Pay differentials 
across executive ranks 
has a positive 
relationship with 
corporate success 
Tournament theory not 
supported: corporate 
success is not significantly 
related to the degree of 
equity in executive pay or 
to the steepness of pay 
differentials across 
executive ranks 
Main, 
O'Reilly, III, 
& Wade 
(1993) 
Archival 
executive pay 
data from 147 
U.S. corporations 
from 1908 to 
1984 
Executive wage 
dispersion has a 
positive effect on 
corporate performance 
Tournament theory 
supported: positive effect 
on the coefficient of 
variation in pay on 
Return-on-Assets in U.S. 
firms 
Eriksson 
(1999) 
Private data 
consisting of 
2,600 executives 
in 210 Danish 
firms 
Pay dispersion across 
the CEO and 
contestants in the 
corporate tournament 
is positively associated 
with performance 
Tournament theory 
supported: coefficient of 
pay variation has a 
positive effect on a 
performance index 
Hendrickson 
& 
Fredrickson 
(2001)  
Sample drawn fro 
the high-tech 
equipment, 
natural resources, 
chemicals, and 
conglomerates 
industries from 
1985 to 1990 
produced a 
database of 189 
firm years 
Behavioral and 
tournament 
perspectives set up as 
competing hypotheses. 
Tournament theory: 
Interaction of CEO 
pay gap interacts and 
coordination is 
positively associated 
with performance; 
Behavioral theory: 
Interaction of CEO 
pay gap interacts and 
coordination is 
negatively associated 
with performance 
Tournament theory 
supported: CEO pay gap 
and TMG coordination 
needs have a positive 
relationship with firm 
performance. Behavioral 
prediction (negative 
relationship) is not 
supported. 
Conyon, Peck 
& Sadler 
(2001) 
Sample of 100 
companies drawn 
from the largest 
150 publicly-
traded companies 
in the U.K. for 
1997 and 1998 
Corporate 
performance is 
positively associated 
with executive wage 
dispersion 
Tournament theory not 
supported: no relationship 
between executive pay 
dispersion and corporate 
performance; authors 
acknowledge that findings 
limited by not including a 
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measure of executive 
interdependence as a 
moderator 
Bloom & 
Michel (2002) 
Sample of 460 
publicly-traded 
U.S. companies 
from 1992 to 
1997 
Executive pay 
dispersion leads to 
lower average 
executive tenure and 
higher executive 
turnover 
Behavioral view 
supported: Both 
performance-related 
hypotheses supported 
Carpenter & 
Sanders 
(2004) 
Sample of 245 
multi-national 
corporations from 
the S&P 500 
Gap between CEO 
total pay and TMG 
member pay will be 
negatively related to 
subsequent MNC 
performance; TMG 
member total pay level 
positively related to  
subsequent MNC 
performance; TMG 
member long-term 
incentive Pay 
positively related to 
subsequent MNC 
performance; joint 
positive relationship 
between TMG member 
pay level, degree of 
internationalization 
and subsequent 
financial performance; 
joint negative 
relationship between 
CEO- TMG pay gap, 
degree of 
internationalization, 
and subsequent 
financial performance 
Behavioral view 
supported: firms with 
more less disperse TMG 
compensation structures 
perform better; degree of 
Internationalization (proxy 
for collective and 
coordination) moderates 
(positive) this relationship 
Siegel & 
Hambrick 
(2005) 
Sample of 67 
vertically 
integrated U.S.-
based technology 
firms in the same 
3-digit SIC code 
for 1991, 1992, 
and 1993 
TMG pay disparity 
and subsequent 
organizational 
performance 
negatively moderated 
by industry 
technological intensity 
Behavioral view 
supported: In high 
technology firms a high 
degree of TMG pay 
disparity led to lower 
levels of performance than 
in low technology firms 
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In early work in labor economics, Main et al. (1993) pit the economic and 
behavioral perspectives against one another in a test of competing hypotheses. In their 
study of pay data from 147 U.S. corporations from 1980 to 1984, the authors found 
support for tournament theory in that wage-dispersing incentive structures enhance 
economic performance. In a later study of 2,600 executives in 210 Danish firms over the 
period from 1992-1995, Eriksson (1999) found support for tournament theory in that a 
coefficient of variation in the difference in pay between the CEO and other contestants in 
the corporate tournament is positively associated with accounting profits. And, 
Hendrickson & Fredrickson (2001) add to this pattern of support.  In their study of the 
top executives of firms in four industry groups (chemicals, high-tech equipment, natural 
resources, and conglomerates), the authors found that tournament theory not only predicts 
the gap between the long-term and total pay awarded to CEOs and that awarded to 
executives at a level lower in the organizational hierarchy, but that larger CEO pay gaps 
are associated with higher return-on-assets (ROA) and return-on-equity (ROE) in firms 
that are characterized by a higher level of related diversification (a proxy for firm-level 
collaboration and coordination needs).  
While some support for the use of compensation schemes based on 
disproportionately large pay differentials has been found in recent work, this stream has 
also identified a negative association with firm outcomes. For example, Bloom & Michel 
(2002) analyzed a data set of 460 organizations in 173 four-digit SIC codes over the years 
of 1992 to 1997 to examine the effects of vertical pay disparities among the members of 
the TMG. Citing behavioral explanations, the authors argued that pay disparities have 
important implications for strategic decision-makers in that greater disparity in TMG pay 
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leads to higher levels of managerial turnover and shorter tenure-"findings that are robust 
across different samples, different times, at different managerial levels, and after 
accounting for external labor market effects" (Bloom & Michel, 2002: 39). In a 
subsequent study, Carpenter & Sanders (2004) analyzed a sample of 224 multinational 
firms to examine the relationship between CEO-TMG total pay gap and subsequent 
financial performance. Arguing that compensation that favors collective action among the 
TMG may be particularly applicable to situations demanding coordination and 
cooperation among individual TMG members, the authors found the gap between CEO 
and TMG member total pay to be negatively associated with subsequent financial 
performance. And, In a study of 67 U.S.-based high technology firms for which 
compensation data was available for 1991, 1992, and 1993, Siegel & Hambrick (2005) 
examined the relationship between pay disparities and subsequent financial performance. 
Arguing that pay disparities among the TMG tends to diminish collaboration by fostering 
competition for advancement to lucrative positions (akin to the tournament mechanism), 
the authors' found pay disparities among the TMG to be negatively related to subsequent 
financial performance.  
2.6 Moderators of the TMG Pay Disparity/Financial Performance Relationship 
Among the empirical themes found in the literature is that some contexts require 
greater levels of task interdependence. Defined as the need for organizational subunits to 
intensively coordinate their activities to achieve peak performance, interdependence 
occurs when organizational subunits share information, negotiate, and make coordinated 
adjustments to cope with an uncertain environment (e.g. Thompson, 1967; Tushman & 
Nadler, 1978). Characteristics in both the internal and external environment have been 
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shown to impose the need for interdependence on executives. For example, in their 
seminal study of firms operating in high velocity environments, Eisenhardt & Burgeois 
(1988) found that external environmental changes called for continuously negotiated 
decisions among members of the TMG. And, as is suggested by the following quote from 
Hambrick (1995), pay differential among TMGs may cause problems for the firm in such 
environments:  
"The performance of every one of these executives depends heavily on the 
others. If I want them to work collaboratively, as a team, it creates severe 
problems to try to reward them differentially." (Hambrick, 1995: 23). 
This point underscores that certain factors in the environment create requirements 
for task interdependence and cohesion within TMGs to the extent that executives should 
be rewarded in ways that incentivize them to interact frequently, to collaborate, and to 
process mutually relevant information in ways that benefit organizational performance. 
And as is entirely consistent with the behavioral view of pay disparities, differential 
rewards paid to the members of the TMG may limit their desire to act with such 
coordination.  
Within the TMG pay disparity literature several factors in both the external and 
organizational environments have been shown to impact the effect that TMG pay 
disparities have on firm performance. For example, in their analysis of proprietary 
compensation data collected from 67 U.S. high-tech firms, Siegel & Hambrick (2005) 
found that a firm’s technological intensiveness leads to worse financial performance. 
They explained their findings by arguing that the more technologically intensive the 
industry, the more harmful for subsequent corporate performance was the presence of pay 
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disparities among the TMG because such disparities tend to result in lower levels of 
"collaboration by fostering competition for advancement to lucrative positions" (Siegel & 
Hambrick, 2005: 271).  
Conversely, evidence supporting tournament theory predictions has also been 
found using moderators of the pay disparity and financial performance relationship at the 
organizational level. For example, in a study of top executives in four industry groups-
chemicals, high-tech equipment, natural resources, and conglomerates, Hendrickson & 
Fredrickson (2001) showed that the level of related diversification moderated a positive 
relationship between pay gaps between the CEO and non-CEO members of the TMG and 
firm performance. On the other hand, in a related study that uses a firm's degree of 
internationalization as a proxy for coordinated information-processing needs of the TMG, 
Carpenter & Sanders (2004) found that the disparity in pay between the CEO and other 
members of the TMG has negative performance effects.  
2.7 Summary and Assessment of the TMG Pay Disparities Literature 
 Research seeking to answer fundamental questions regarding TMG pay disparities 
reviewed in the previous subsections has provided interesting insights. On the other hand, 
research designed to identify the performance-related implications of TMG pay 
disparities and the factors that moderate this relationship is far more equivocal with both 
the economic and behavioral perspectives receiving some support (Guthrie, 2007). 
Efforts in this area have led to a call by Siegel & Hambrick (2005) for continued 
exploration in this area because TMG pay disparities are of strategic and economic 
consequence to organizations.  
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To date, only a few analyses of the antecedents of TMG pay disparities have been 
conducted. Yet, this research raises key questions regarding the factors that create 
situations in which TMG pay is widely disparate. Economic arguments have centered on 
the use of compensation schemes based entirely on the use of sequential elimination 
tournaments punctuated by disproportionately large pay differentials at the level of the 
CEO. In summary, this literature offers that (1) compensation and hierarchical level have 
a convex relationship with disproportionately larger pay differentials at the top of the 
corporate hierarchy, (2) that the size of pay differentials is related to the size of the 
tournament (e.g. the number of contestants in it), and that (3) the pay gap between the 
CEO and the next level lower in the hierarchy is associated with firm-related strategic 
factors like the extent of the firm’s investment in R&D activity and capital expenditures. 
This body of work bears strategic relevance because pay disparities among TMG 
members has been linked with firm performance implications (e.g. Bloom & Michel, 
2002; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005).  
While the use of economic and strategic factors has yielded substantial insight, 
there is recognition that TMG pay disparities do not necessarily imply the use of pay–for-
performance schemes (e.g. corporate tournaments), and that widely disparate pay may 
result from factors in the firm’s political environment (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Hence, 
it is reasonable to assert that incorporation of explanatory perspectives in the managerial 
power and managerial discretion literatures may serve to add to the existing body of 
knowledge in ways that create greater insights into the TMG pay disparity puzzle.  
Efforts to identify the performance-related consequences of executive pay 
disparities are warranted (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). Yet, to date, only a few studies 
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have been conducted. As is common in an emerging literature there is significant 
diversity in the research questions and perspectives used to establish a foundation of 
knowledge. Research on the performance implications of TMG pay disparities is not 
different. Researchers have used both economic (e.g. tournament theory) and behavioral 
(e.g. equity and relative deprivation theories) arguments to examine this relationship 
concluding that pay disparities are both beneficial and detrimental to financial 
performance depending on the extent of TMG pay disparities and the context in which 
such disparities exist (e.g. degree of task interdependence). The extent to which results 
are mixed suggests that both models may have explanatory power. In fact, Bloom & 
Michel (2002) suggest that the use of a nonlinear model may be warranted.  
Analysis of the research also indicates that the extent to which a TMG’s 
coordination and collaboration needs are influenced by factors in the external and 
organizational environments will moderate the theorized relationship between TMG pay 
disparities and subsequent financial performance. Using proxies for task interdependence 
in both the external environment (e.g. technological intensiveness) and in the 
organizational environment (e.g. degree of internationalization and level of related 
diversification), researchers using such moderators have provided more consistent 
findings (e.g. Bloom & Michel, 2002; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Siegel & Hambrick, 
2005) than those that omit such potential moderators (e.g. Conyon et al., 2001). To this 
extent, Conyon et al. (2001) acknowledge that the omission of such a moderator is a key 
limitation in their study and a reason for limited findings in support of tournament theory.  
This dissertation seeks to do two things. First, it identifies elements in the firm’s 
socio-political environment as antecedents of TMG pay disparities. In as much, it will 
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draw from the extant work in the managerial power and discretion literatures to develop a 
theoretical model that addresses the call of Pfeffer & Langton (1993) to examine the 
political factors in organizations that lead to pay disparities. Second, this dissertation 
attempts to answer the call of Siegel & Hambrick (2005) to examine the nature of the 
proposed relationship between TMG pay disparities and subsequent financial 
performance as is conditioned by factors in the firm’s external environment that require 
increased collaboration and coordination.  
To my knowledge this will be the first study in the TMG pay disparities literature 
that delves into the sociopolitical antecedents of the distribution of compensation 
resources at the level of the TMG. By integrating managerial power and managerial 
discretion this dissertation attempts to move the debate beyond the economic view that 
TMG pay disparities are a function of compensation schemes based on the use of 
sequential elimination tournaments and disproportionately large pay differentials. 
Additionally, this is the first study in the TMG pay disparities literature that not only tests 
the economic and behavioral perspectives as competing hypotheses, but also integrates 
both perspectives in a test of a nonmonotonic relationship between TMG pay disparities 
and subsequent financial performance.  
The following chapter of this dissertation integrates perspectives of managerial 
power and managerial discretion with arguments developed in the corporate governance 
literature in an attempt to develop a theoretical model that addresses the questions 
outlined in the first chapter. Chapter 3 begins with a presentation of the theoretical model 
followed by the development of hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
In the previous chapter, I examined the extant TMG pay disparity literature in an 
attempt to identify opportunities for extending the extant framework. This chapter will 
introduce and develop a theoretical model and testable hypotheses that are designed to 
extend the extant literature by introducing and integrating elements of managerial power 
and managerial discretion. I theorize that, under certain conditions, CEOs will have the 
power necessary to consume a disproportionately large share of the TMG’s compensation 
resources (relative to other TMG members). Managerial discretion will be integrated as a 
moderator of the theorized relationship because it is expected that the capacity of the 
CEO to appropriate greater compensation resources may be higher in organizational 
environments characterized by higher levels of discretion. Additionally, theory will be 
developed to introduce the relative power of non-CEO members of the TMG as a 
moderator of the theorized relationship because it is expected that such power will serve 
to limit the capacity of the incumbent CEO to consume disproportionate compensation 
resources. Lastly, in this chapter I will attempt to add nuance to the extant literature 
focused on the performance-related implications of TMG pay disparities by developing 
competing hypotheses based on both the economic and behavioral perspectives and by 
integrating the two perspectives in a test of nonmonotonic relationship.  
3.1 Rationale for the Theoretical model 
“It is not enough for a leader to know the right thing. He must be able to 
do the right thing. The…leader without the judgment or perception to 
make the right decisions fails for lack of vision. The one who knows the 
right thing but cannot achieve it fails because he is ineffectual. The great 
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leader needs…the capacity to achieve” – Richard Nixon (in Pfeffer, 1992: 
8). 
As is suggested by the above quote, it is not enough for organizational leaders to 
simply know what they must do. They must also possess the capacity to act in ways that 
see their intentions through to fruition. As applicable in strategic contexts as it is in 
political contexts, this statement suggests that the effective leader must be able to produce 
intended effects even in the face of resistance. With a long history of study in sociology, 
power has alternately been defined as the “intentional and effective control by particular 
agents (Wrong, 1968: 676)”, “production of intended effects by some men over other 
men” (Russell, 1938: 25), and the capacity to “realize one’s own will even over the 
resistance of others” (Weber, 1946: 180). In this dissertation I adopt the definition offered 
by Pfeffer (1992: 30) in that power is seen as the “potential ability to influence behavior, 
to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that 
they would not otherwise do.”  
Pettigrew (1973: 240) argues that “an accurate perception of the power 
distribution in the social arena in which he lives is a necessary prerequisite for the man 
seeking powerful support for his demands.” Profit-seeking organizations, which have 
been characterized as constellations of coalitions of stakeholders that include managers, 
employees, shareholders, suppliers, and customers with often different and competing 
interests, are contexts in which such support is required (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; 
Mahoney, 2005). Because strategic decisions are inherently unstructured, and replete 
with ambiguity and uncertainty, they are intrinsically political in that they involve 
decisions made by actors with often conflicting views who resolve such conflict through 
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negotiation and the use of power (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Finkelstein, 1992; 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976). It follows that the capacity to set the direction 
of the firm, and to make and implement strategic choices (even those concerning the 
distribution of bounded compensation resources) is the product of a negotiated process 
achieved by those managers that possess the capacity to exert their will (Eisenhardt, 
1988).  
While power is necessary to set the direction of the firm, powerf can also have 
negative consequences for the firm. To agency theorists (e.g. Berle & Means, 1932; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the concept of centralized power in publicly-
traded firms is closely related to the concept of managerial control. In the modern 
business environment, the publicly-traded firm is characterized by disperse ownership, 
which results in the capacity of corporate managers to centralize their power as 
traditional checks like communication and coordinated action among owners disappear 
(Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Centralized power results in the physical control over the 
methods of production as organizational control is increasingly ceded to powerful 
managers (Mahoney, 2005): often to the detriment of other organizational stakeholders.  
One arena in which the distribution of power has been used to predict the 
distribution of rewards in strategic management is in the study of CEO compensation. For 
example, theorists (e.g. Allen, 1981; Kemper, 1976) have argued that corporate managers 
are able to overcompensate themselves for their roles because their power goes relatively 
unchecked. In this sense, power in the hands of executives may be conceptualized as a 
double-edged sword. Further, Lenski (1966: 355) noted that “the fantastically high 
salaries of managers in American industry can be explained only by their power position 
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within the organization.” Empirical results show that powerful CEOs are capable of 
systematically decoupling their compensation from the profit-maximizing interests of 
firm shareholders while coupling it with personally favorable outcomes such as firm size 
and unrelated diversification (e.g. Amihud & Lev, 1981; Baumol, 1967; Kroll, Simmons, 
& Wright, 1990). To this end, powerful executives may be able to overcome the 
constraints prescribed by proponents of agency theory who assert that compensation 
should be tied to the profitability of the firm (Fama, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  
In an early direct test of the extent to which compensation received by CEOs is 
related to the power that they wield within the corporation, Allen (1981) found that 
powerful CEOs receive more direct and total compensation than less powerful CEOs. 
And, arguing that CEOs use their power to take a cut from the firm’s profits before 
sharing the remainder of the firm’s profits (e.g. residuals) with shareholders, Barkema & 
Pennings (1998) found that the power rooted in social-exchange contracts and 
information asymmetry versus the board of directors can be used to manipulate in an 
effort to increase bonuses and salaries. And, in a study of the power of CEOs and their 
capacity to change the strike price of their stock options, Pollock & Fisher (2002) 
analyzed the power of the CEO that arises from occupying both the position of the CEO 
and Chairman of the Board, and found that powerful CEOs have a greater capacity to 
change the strike price of their stock options resulting in a reduction of the downside risk 
of stock option pay, which decouples their pay from financial performance. Among 
others, these studies show that CEO power may imbue the capacity to pursue objectives 
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which are not entirely consistent with shareholder maximization (Daily & Johnson, 
1997). 
3.2 Centralized CEO Power and The TMG 
Given the potentially self-serving manner in which power may be used, there is 
reason to theorize that greater CEO power will lead to more disparate pay among 
members of the TMG.  Many organizations have a triangular structure in which most 
senior executives arrive at the apex of the organizations by competing up through the 
ranks in sequential elimination tournaments (Beckmann, 1978). Further, as is indicated 
by the review and analysis of the TMG pay disparities literature in chapter 2, disparities 
in TMG pay are, at least, partially a function of this process by which successful 
contestants ascend to the title of CEO thereby receiving a disproportionately large pay 
increase. While this argument has received empirical support in the labor economics and 
strategic management literatures, what is not explicitly acknowledged is that ascension to 
the title of CEO by one tournament contestant (e.g. the COO) can only occur if the office 
is abdicated by the incumbent CEO.  
Empirical results in a variety of literatures in strategic management (e.g. takeover 
defense, succession, entrenchment, etc.) have shown that incumbent CEOs are often 
unwilling to leave their positions voluntarily (e.g. Buccholz & Ribbens, 1994; Eisenhardt 
& Bourgeois, 1988; Ocasio, 1994; Sonnenfeld, 1988; Ward, Sonnenfeld, & Kimberly, 
1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). However, as is implicitly argued by tournament 
theorists, the power of incumbent CEOs is likely to be challenged by rivals in the firm’s 
sequential elimination tournament as potential rivals to the CEO emerge as a function of 
their desire to win the title of CEO and its associated disproportionate pay increase. 
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Hence, the mechanics of tournament theory are analogous to the explicit circulation of 
power arguments offered by organization theorists (e.g. Ocasio, 1994; Selznick, 1957). 
That is, within TMGs, the distribution of power is not static because individual members 
of the TMG seek to gain power (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Ocasio, 1994; Selznick, 
1957; Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002; Zhang, 2006). In such environments, rule by corporate 
elites does not always endure because they may be characterized by intra-elite 
competition for the power associated with the CEO’s job. In as much, TMG members at 
the upper echelons of corporations may be seen as potential rivals to the incumbent CEO. 
Instead of being controlled by the CEO, potential rivals within this dominant coalition 
may have interests that are independent of those of the incumbent CEO (e.g. becoming 
CEO) that become manifest only as a result of successful challenges to the incumbent 
CEO’s power and position (Hambrick, 1994; Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002; 
Zhang, 2006). As a result of competition for the CEO’s title and the resultant privileges, 
the CEO’s power is considered to be subject to contestation over time balanced by 
periods of relative stability (Ocasio, 1994).  
Tournament theory argues that executives successfully compete there way to the 
CEO’s office in an attempt to achieve the ultimate career prize. However, irrespective of 
the source of the threat to his/her power (e.g. competition among ambitious tournament 
contestants or corporate takeovers), incumbent CEOs are likely to be unwilling to 
relinquish their power associated with their position without a fight. On the contrary, they 
are more likely to extend their tenures in office (e.g. Allen, 1981; Boeker, 1992; 
Buccholz & Ribbens, 1994; Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002). In as much, the incumbent 
CEO’s power may be seen as a countervailing force that serves to enhance his/her 
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capacity to remain in office despite the challenges offered by potential rivals (see figure 
3.1). As a result, the incumbent CEO may have the capacity to continue to enjoy the 
associated disproportionate pay gap vis-à-vis other members of the TMG. Hence, CEOs 
with centralized and institutionalized power can be expected to attempt to suppress 
competition in the corporate tournament so as to both preserve their position and power 
and to continue to enjoy the associated privileges.  
Figure 3.2: Incumbent CEO Suppression of Competition for the CEO Title 
 
 
CEO
(level
n- n)
non-CEO TMG
(level n - (n +1)
Level n
Level n - 1
...
CEO Power
 
In an empirical attempt to examine the consequences of the power relationship 
between CEOs and non-CEO members of the TMGs Boeker (1992) studied 67 
organizations over a 22-year period and found that powerful CEOs are less likely to be 
dismissed in periods of poor performance because they are able to deflect blame for poor 
performance onto their less powerful TMG counterparts. Hence, it is the powerful CEO’s 
rivals who are more likely to be displaced.  
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3.3 Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
 As is summarized in Figure 3.2, a CEO’s power is theorized to be critical to the 
existence of TMG pay disparities. I theorize that a CEO’s power (comprised of structural, 
ownership, and prestige elements) in period t-2 will be positively related to a firm’s TMG 
pay disparities (in period t-1) in that greater power will provide CEOs with the capacity to 
consume a disproportionate share of the firm’s TMG compensation resources above and 
beyond that explained by tournament theory explanations. Further, I argue that TMG pay 
disparities will have a direct effect on subsequent financial performance.  
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Figure 3.3: Theoretical Model 
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I expect the aforementioned relationship to be moderated by two factors. First, I 
expect that this relationship will be stronger in firm environments that are characterized 
by higher levels of discretion. That is, in firm environments that impose fewer constraints 
on the incumbent CEO, power will lead to more disparate pay within the TMG. 
Conversely, I expect this relationship to be weakened by the presence of relatively 
powerful others in the TMG. Further, because I assume that TMG compensation resources 
are bounded, I argue that when CEOs have the capacity to consume a greater proportion 
of TMG compensation resources, other members of the TMG necessarily consume less. 
And, assuming that individual TMG members will wish to consume more compensation 
resources, I theorize that they may be able to constrain the CEO’s power to consume 
greater compensation resources when they are relatively powerful.  
The model also specifies competing hypotheses regarding the theorized 
relationship between TMG pay disparities and subsequent financial performance. With 
the behavioral perspective of TMG pay disparities as a theoretical foundation, it is 
expected that subsequent financial performance will suffer in firms where TMG pay 
disparities are relatively high. Conversely, and based on the economic perspective of 
TMG pay disparities, subsequent financial performance is expected to strengthen as a 
function of relatively higher TMG pay disparities. Additionally, a nonmonotonic 
relationship will be analyzed. Further, the theorized relationship between TMG pay 
disparities and subsequent financial performance is expected to be moderated by the need 
for coordination imposed by the external environment. In as much, the need for 
coordination is expected to strengthen the negative relationship between TMG pay 
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disparities and subsequent financial performance because it affects the capacity of TMG 
to act in a coordinated manner.  
In accordance with previous studies, I use several individual measures of CEO 
power as antecedents to TMG pay disparities. Additionally, it may be that such individual 
measures may be component elements of broader CEO power constructs (e.g. structural 
power, ownership power, prestige power). This methodological potentiality will be 
examined, secondarily. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I develop theory and 
the associated hypotheses that are depicted by Figure 3.2. 
3.4 Sources of CEO Power and Their Influence on Pay Disparity 
In the strategic management literature, CEO power has been conceptualized and 
measured in a number of different ways that incorporate the use of individual proxies. 
However, broader examination has turned to the use of a multidimensional measurement 
typology developed by Finkelstein (1992). Based on a sample of 1,763 top managers in 
three industries, Finkelstein constructed and tested a multi-dimensional model of CEO 
power that was based on four different sources of power. His stated intent was to focus 
the strategic management scholar’s attention specifically on the power held by members 
of the TMG. What emerged from his study was that CEO power could be conceptualized 
as multi-dimensional with sources of power associated with the CEO’s location in the 
organizational structure, his/her ownership, and prestige. 
3.4.1 Structural Power  
Also referred to as hierarchical power, a CEO’s structural power refers to the 
power that is based on formal organizational position in the organizational system (e.g. 
Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; D’Aveni & Kessner, 1993; Daily & Johnson, 1997). It 
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emanates from the CEO’s authority or legitimate power, and represents the 
institutionalized privilege of incumbency that is stored in the formal role associated with 
the position (Astely & Sachdeva, 1984). In this sense, CEOs have a legitimate right to 
exert influence and to enjoy power over other members of the organization (including 
non-CEO members of the TMG) because of their formal position in the organization 
(Finkelstein, 1992). While other members of the TMG may challenge the power of 
incumbent CEOs, relatively high structural power affords the capacity to exert the 
influence necessary to mitigate potential challenges thereby leaving TMG counterparts 
more likely to defer because structural power confers the “right to exercise power by 
virtue of their position” (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984: 105-106). As a result, structural 
power is a function of the formal social recognition of one’s power.  
Several structural sources of power have been used as proxies of CEO power in 
the managerial power and agency literatures. Among them are CEO duality, the 
proportion of outside board members appointed by the incumbent CEO, and the CEO’s 
tenure in the position. 
CEO Duality.  Commonly used in the agency theory and corporate governance 
literatures CEO duality can be seen as a measure of a CEO’s structural power. A common 
phenomena, CEO duality refers to the dual leadership structure in which the CEO wears 
two hats-one as the CEO of the firm and the other as board chairperson (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Supporters of this centralized leadership 
structure argue that it provides a single focal point of company leadership in that there is 
never a question about who is boss (Anderson & Anthony, 1986). On the other hand, 
detractors counter that the dual leadership structure systematically reduces the board’s 
 46
independence and it’s ability to effectively monitor the CEO and other members of the 
TMG. Given that one of the fiduciary responsibilities of the board is to monitor the 
performance of top management, allowing the CEO to occupy both roles increases the 
CEO’s power and compromises the system of checks and balances (Rechner & Dalton, 
1991). Absent effective monitoring, dual CEOs are better able to pursue interests which 
serve them personally rather than other organizational stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). For instance, the dual leadership structure allows the CEO to control the agenda of 
board meetings, to determine what information directors receive in advance of meetings, 
and to lead board meeting discussions (Daily & Johnson, 1997).  
Additionally, an individual that holds both leadership positions is thought to be 
more powerful and less easily dislodged than when the positions are held by separate 
people (Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988). This phenomenon has been associated with 
several economically and strategically relevant, but dysfunctional, outcomes. For 
instance, in a study of the repricing of stock options in the latter six months of 1998, 
Pollock, & Fisher (2002) found CEO duality to be associated with the probability that 
stock options will be repriced. That is, dual CEOs have a greater ability to change the 
strike price of their options, thereby limiting the downside risk that is faced by other 
stockholders. In a study of 671 large American manufacturing firms from 1978 to 1981, 
Harrison et al. (1988) found that obtaining this joint leadership position results in a 
centralization and institutionalization of power that lessens the likelihood of turnover in 
cases of poor financial performance. Characterizing joint CEO/board chairperson 
structures as “governance structure deficiencies” (Daily & Dalton, 1994: 649) in a study 
of publicly-traded firms filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1990, Daily & 
 47
Dalton (1994) found that the structural combination of CEO and Board Chairperson roles 
in one person limits the board’s power to install new management in an effort to facilitate 
corporate turnarounds. And, in a study of 193 firms in 12 industry groups, Boyd (1994) 
found that CEO duality was negatively associated with board control, and that it resulted 
in higher levels of CEO compensation. Further, arguing that firms with dual CEOs have 
greater agency problems, Core, Holthausen, & Larcker (1999) found that CEOs earn 
greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. 
Having theorized that incumbent CEOs have the motivation to preserve their 
positions and the consumption of disproportionate pay vis-a-vis their non-CEO TMG 
counterparts, having the capacity to centralize power through acting in a dual leadership 
function will allow them to limit the competition for their jobs and the compensation 
benefits that they enjoy leaving them to consume a disproportionately large share of the 
TMG’s compensation resources. Hence, the above theoretical arguments and prior 
empirical evidence leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between CEO duality 
(structural power) and TMG pay disparities. 
Interdependent Directors. The composition of the board of directors may also 
serve as an indicator of the CEO’s structural power. (Boeker, 1992; Daily & Johnson, 
1997; Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002). Of consideration is the extent to which 
the CEO is able to exert influence over the board of directors. As the fiduciaries of the 
firm’s owners, the primary responsibility of the board of directors is to hire the CEO, 
reward him/her commensurate with firm performance, and to fire the CEO when 
performance falls below acceptable levels. Yet, as Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin 
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(1988: 256) have argued, boards of directors “act out of self-interest (e.g. concern for 
friendships, their image, wealth, reputation) when deciding to dismiss or retain a CEO.”  
One way to examine the CEO’s structural power vis-a-vis the board of directors is 
to examine the interdependent directors that serve on the board (Daily & Dalton, 1994). 
While independent directors are the outside directors not appointed by the incumbent 
CEO (Wade, O’Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990), interdependent directors are the directors 
that are appointed by the incumbent CEO (Daily & Dalton, 1994). Interdependent board 
members appointed during the incumbent CEO’s tenure are more likely to be individuals 
with whom the CEO feels comfortable, approved of, and who feel loyalty to the CEO for 
their appointments. As a result, these interdependent directors may feel some loyalty to 
the CEOs that are responsible for their appointment (Boeker, 1992) and allow them to 
pursue agendas that serve them personally. 
Although no empirical consensus has been reached regarding the role that 
interdependent directors play in enhancing a CEO’s structural power, a few studies show 
that the presence of higher proportions of interdependent directors is, in fact, power-
enhancing to CEOs. For instance, Lambert et al. (1993) documented a positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and interdependent directors. Additionally, Core 
et al. (1999) documented that CEO compensation is an increasing function of the 
proportion of outside directors appointed by the CEO. Interestingly, and of note, is that 
the authors also found that the proportion of insiders serving on the board is negatively 
related to CEO compensation (a finding consistent with the theory developed in chapter 
3).  
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Having theorized that incumbent CEOs have the motivation to preserve their 
positions and the consumption of disproportionate pay vis-a-vis their non-CEO TMG 
counterparts, having the capacity to appoint board members who are likely to be 
sympathetic to the incumbent CEO’s capacity to pursue his/her agenda will facilitate 
higher levels of structural power. Such power will serve to limit the competition for their 
jobs and the compensation benefits that they enjoy leaving them to consume a 
disproportionately large share of the TMG’s compensation resources. Hence, the above 
theoretical arguments and prior empirical evidence lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a positive relationship between the interdependent 
directors on the board of directors (structural power) and TMG pay disparities. 
CEO Tenure. Once CEOs are appointed they are in a position to centralize and 
institutionalize their power (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Because it takes time to 
centralize and institutionalize one’s power, time in the position of CEO can be an 
important source of structural power. Barkema & Pennings (1998) argued that tenure 
institutionalizes exchange relationships both within and without the firm and makes them 
durable characteristics of the governance structure. As a result, relatively long tenure is 
expected to result in entrenched power as the CEO is better able to pursue his/her own 
interests vis-a-vis other organizational stakeholders. In this sense, it is argued that power 
accrues to longer-tenured CEOs for two reasons. First, they are more likely to nominate 
new board members who subsequently feel a sense of loyalty to the nominating CEO 
thereby resulting in greater structural power. Such board members are expected to hold a 
sympathetic view of the CEO’s agenda over the course of his/her tenure (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1989). Second, long-tenured CEOs are able to gain increasing control over the 
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firm’s internal communication systems over time thereby yielding the capacity to control 
the information that is made available to both members of the board and other members 
of the TMG. As a result, CEOs become more embedded in their positions and 
increasingly powerful as their tenure increases (Barkema & Pennings, 1998). 
Several empirical studies have documented effects of the CEO power that results 
from relatively long tenures. For example, Hill & Phan (1991) found that as CEO tenure 
lengthens the capacity to decouple compensation from shareholder preferences (e.g. a 
higher stock price) and to tie it to personal preferences (e.g. larger firm size) increases. 
The authors argued that the results obtain because CEOs are able to circumvent 
monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms as their power grows. Additionally, in a 
study of CEO compensation in management-controlled firms, Hambrick & Finkelstein 
(1989) found that long-tenured CEOs are able to secure disproportionately larger pay 
increases as their tenure increases. And, in a study that examines the capacity of long-
tenured CEOs to preserve their positions, Shen & Cannella (2002) found that the shorter 
a CEO’s tenure, the more likely the CEO is to be replaced by an insider. This result 
shows that CEOs with relatively short tenures are more vulnerable to challenges as they 
may lack the structural power necessary to ward off challenges to their position. In fact, 
CEOs of relatively short tenure are more likely to be dismissed followed by the inside 
succession of a rival in the TMG in a study of 367 large U.S. corporations.  
Having theorized that incumbent CEOs have the motivation to preserve their 
positions and the consumption of disproportionate pay vis-a-vis their non-CEO TMG 
counterparts, having the capacity to institutionalize structural power over time is 
hypothesized to result in the ability to consume disproportionate pay vis-à-vis the other 
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members of the TMG. Hence, the above theoretical arguments and prior empirical 
evidence lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive relationship between a CEO’s tenure in the 
position (structural power) and TMG pay disparities. 
3.4.2 Ownership Power 
Agency theorists (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988) have long-argued that CEOs who hold a substantial stake in 
the firm’s ownership are more likely to pursue the profit-maximizing interests associated 
with ownership. Yet, managerialists have argued that power is likely to accrue to CEOs 
who maintain substantial ownership positions in their firms in their capacity as agents 
acting on behalf of firm shareholders (e.g. Daily & Johnson, 1997). CEOs with 
substantial shareholdings may enjoy the capacity to influence important firm decisions as 
a function of their ownership capacity, and are more likely to be powerful than CEOs that 
lack a similar ownership stake (Zald, 1969). The literature identifies two main sources of 
ownership power.  
Equity Ownership. Essentially, power accrues in direct comparison to that of 
shareholders. And, the power that accrues to the CEO is partially determined by the 
proportion of shares owned by the CEO (Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1989; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Empirical evidence in the managerial entrenchment 
literature has shown that CEO power increases as a function of equity ownership, and 
that increased power has economically and strategically relevant consequences. For 
example, in an early study in financial economics, McEachern (1975) found that CEOs 
who had substantial equity holdings had longer tenures in poorly performing firms than 
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did CEOs that had less substantial equity holdings. Further, Stulz (1988) found that as 
CEO equity ownership increases the capacity to resist takeovers by bidding firms 
declines. And, Dahya, Dimitrov, & McConnell (2006) found a negative relationship 
between performance-related turnover and CEO equity ownership. In summary, findings 
suggest that CEOs are better able to enjoy the benefits of power when they have 
substantial equity holdings in the firm (e.g. Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Buccholtz & 
Ribbens, 1994; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer, 1981).  
Empirically, ownership power has been shown to be associated with a CEO’s 
capacity to resist takeovers (Buccholtz & Ribbens, 1994), the capacity to lower the 
probability of dismissal (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002), and the capacity to define the 
firm’s direction (Allen, 1981). Another of the privileges associated with relatively high 
levels of CEO equity ownership is the capacity to consume a greater amount of the firm’s 
compensation resources. For example, Ungson & Steers (1984) found that in firms where 
the CEO has large shareholdings that the CEO can determine his/her own pay structure. 
In arguing that CEOs with higher levels of equity ownership have the capacity to extract 
greater pay, Finklestein & Hambrick (1989) found that executives who own significant 
portions of their firm’s outstanding shares are more likely to control both operating and 
board decisions to the extent that they may be able to set their own compensation. And, in 
a direct test of CEO power (measured by equity ownership) on a 1985 sample of Dutch 
top executives, Barkema & Pennings (1998) found that top managers are able to use the 
power associated with their equity ownership to manipulate their salary and bonuses in 
their favor.  
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Having theorized that incumbent CEOs have the motivation to preserve their 
positions and the right to consume disproportionate pay vis-a-vis their non-CEO TMG 
counterparts, having the capacity to direct the affairs of the corporation as a result of 
relatively high levels of equity ownership is hypothesized to result in the capacity to limit 
rival contestations to their positions and power, and to continue to consume 
disproportionate pay vis-à-vis other members of the TMG. Hence, the above theoretical 
arguments and prior empirical evidence lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There will be a positive relationship between the proportion of 
outstanding shares held by the CEO (ownership power) and TMG pay disparities.  
Founder Status. Another form of ownership is the status of founder or 
membership in the founding family. Founders are theorized to gain power through their 
long-term interaction with the board in that they have the capacity to translate their 
unique positions into control over the board (Finkelstein, 1992). Additionally, Carroll 
(1984) argued that founders enjoy personal power because they have relatively higher 
levels of commitment, enhanced entrepreneurial and technical skills, and stronger 
personal ties with employees and board members.  
Research regarding the relationship of ownership power conveyed by status as 
founder is sparse. However, several arguments have been advanced. Sarason (1972) 
argued that founders who stay with the firm after founding for an extended period of time 
are able to institutionalize structural power. McEachern (1975) argued that founders 
enjoy lower rates of succession because they enjoy greater economic and political power 
relative to other members of the TMG. Some researchers have found that status as 
founder results in the capacity to remain in office due to lower rates of succession 
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(McEachern, 1975: Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio, 1999). For example, using interview data and 
historical analyses of companies in the higher education publishing industry from 1958-
1990, Thornton & Ocasio (1999) found that founders enjoyed lower levels of succession 
than did non-founders.  
Having theorized that incumbent CEOs have the motivation to preserve their 
positions and the consumption of disproportionate pay vis-a-vis their non-CEO TMG 
counterparts, having the capacity to direct the affairs of the corporation as a result of 
enjoying founder status is hypothesized to result in the capacity to limit rival 
contestations to their positions and power, and to continue to consume disproportionate 
pay vis-à-vis other members of the TMG. Hence, the above theoretical arguments and 
prior empirical evidence lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: There will be a positive relationship between the CEO’s status as 
founder or member of the founding family (ownership power) and TMG pay 
disparities. 
3.4.3 Prestige Power  
The managerial elite consists of those executives “who occupy formally defined 
positions of authority at the head of a social organization or institution” (Giddens, 1972: 
348). Because institutional environments are comprised of social actors like governments, 
financial institutions, and other external actors, a CEO’s image among stakeholders 
affects perceptions of their influence (Dalton, Barnes, & Zaleznik, 1968). Additionally, a 
CEO’s membership in the managerial elite conveys an image to other members of the 
TMG a relatively high level of importance (Finkelstein, 1992; Useem, 1979). Prestigious 
CEOs can aid in legitimizing the firm in that prestige conveys power by facilitating the 
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absorption of uncertainty from the institutional environment by allowing the prestigious 
CEO to acquire information from other elites that serves to reduce the uncertainty faced 
by the firm (Finkelstein, 1992). Additionally, prestige power is conveyed when a CEO is 
perceived to have “gilt-edged qualifications and powerful friends” (Finkelstein, 1992: 
510) to the extent that enjoying such status facilitates interorganizational linkages and 
interpersonal affiliations that convey high status (D’Aveni & Kessner, 1993)  
External Boards. One measure of the power afforded to prestigious CEOs is the 
capacity to participate as an outside board member of the boards of peer firms. Acting in 
the capacity of director on the board of other social organizations or institutions increases 
the capacity to form interorganizational linkages and interpersonal affiliations with 
corporate elites that serve to bolster the incumbent CEO’s image among peers and 
potential rivals. For example, empirical research in the anti-takeover literature has found 
that the external boards a CEO sits on conveys the power necessary to block punishment 
(e.g. dismissal) for poor performance (Davis, 1991). And, poison pills were more 
frequently adopted when CEOs sat on more external boards. Other studies have 
confirmed this finding in that such prestige leads to the adoption of takeover defenses by 
companies at risk of becoming takeover targets (e.g. Wade et al., 1990). CEO prestige 
also enhances the CEO’s capacity to fight off unwanted competition in that he/she may 
be able to use elite connections to resist the performance-related punishment that may 
otherwise result in replacement by rival members of the TMG. Thus, the external board 
connections of prestigious CEOs may be enlisted as allies in the fight for the preservation 
of power.  
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Empirically, few tests have been conducted to evaluate the strategically relevant 
effects of CEO prestige. However, D’Aveni (1990) found that prestigious top managers 
exited in the five years prior to bankruptcy filing resulting in the withdrawal of the 
support of key stakeholders in a manner that demonstrates that they enjoyed information 
advantages. In a later study of how firms respond to tender offers, D’Aveni & Kessner 
(1993) found that target executives who lacked prestige were less likely to resist tender 
offers made by more prestigious bidders.  
Having theorized that incumbent CEOs have the motivation to preserve their 
positions and the consumption of disproportionate pay vis-a-vis their non-CEO TMG 
counterparts, prestige may present potential rivals in the TMG with an image of high 
relative power. In as much, prestige power may convey the capacity to suppress the 
competition that arises within corporate tournaments thereby leaving incumbent CEO 
able to consume disproportionately large shares of TMG compensation resources. Hence, 
the above theoretical arguments and prior empirical evidence lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: There will be a positive relationship between the External Boards 
the CEO sits on (prestige power) and TMG pay disparities. 
Elite Education. In addition to the external boards that a CEO sits on, prestige 
power may be conveyed by the CEO’s educational background (D’Aveni, 1990; 
Finkelstein, 1992). This argument presumes that attendance at certain elite schools (see 
table 3.4.3 for the complete list) is replete with an aura of prominence in the corporate 
elite (Finkelstein, 1992; Useem, 1979).  
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Table 3.4.3: Elite Education Institutions (Reproduced and Modified from 
Finkelstein, 1992) 
Amherst College Pomona College 
Brown University Princeton University 
Carleton College Stanford University 
Cambridge University Swarthmore College 
Columbia University United States Military Academy 
Cornell University United States Naval Academy 
Dartmouth College University of California, Berkeley 
Grinnell College University of California, Los Angeles 
Harvard University University of Chicago 
Haverford College University of Michigan 
Johns Hopkins University  University of Pennsylvania 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Wellesley College 
New York University Wesleyan University 
Northwestern University Williams College 
Oberlin College Yale University 
Oxford University  
 
Much in the same way that membership on external corporate boards provides 
interorganizational linkages and interpersonal relationships for CEOs, membership in the 
education elite is theorized to provide similar linkages with executives at other important 
organizations thereby conveying considerable prestige both in the institutional and 
organizational environments (Useem, 1979). Additionally, candidates for corporate 
governance positions often come from this group of elites indicating that CEOs with elite 
educational backgrounds may be more powerful than other members of the TMG 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Useem, 1979). Little empirical research has been done in this area. 
However, Daily & Johnson (1997) found that CEOs with prestigious educational 
backgrounds are granted relatively wide discretion within firms as a result of the image of 
control and competence that are conveyed by prestige (D’Aveni, 1990).  
Having theorized that incumbent CEOs have the motivation to preserve their 
positions and the consumption of disproportionate pay vis-a-vis their non-CEO TMG 
counterparts, prestige may present potential rivals in the TMG with an image of high 
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relative power. In as much, prestige power may convey the capacity to suppress the 
competition that arises within corporate tournaments thereby leaving incumbent CEOs 
able to consume disproportionately large shares of TMG compensation resources. Hence, 
the above theoretical arguments and prior empirical evidence lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: There will be a positive relationship between the CEO’s elite 
education status (prestige power) and TMG pay disparities. 
3.5 Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion 
 Contrary to the determinism argued by early proponents of population ecology 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984), an organization’s form and fate do not rest entirely outside 
of the control of its top executives (Child, 1972). In certain situations, managers are 
provided with a greater capacity to shape the course of the organization than in others 
(Child, 1972; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Research on top managers often 
emphasizes that executives have the capacity to affect firm outcomes. Yet, it is accepted 
that even powerful CEOs do not have complete latitude of action (Finklestein & 
Hambrick, 1990).  
Defined as the latitude of action conveyed to CEOs by their environmental 
contexts, discretion is theorized to be shaped by three forces: (1) the degree to which the 
industry environment allows variety and change; (2) the degree to which the organization 
empowers the CEO to formulate and execute a variety of actions; and, (3) the degree to 
which the executive is able to envision or create courses of action (Boyd & Gove, 2007; 
Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Yet, from an empirical standpoint, discretion has served 
primarily as a moderator of strategic choice where managerial impact on organizational 
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outcomes is greatest when discretion is high (e.g. Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995). Among the few empirical studies of discretion most focus the level 
of analysis on industry-level discretion (Chan, Martin, & Kensiger, 1990; Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995) and firm-level discretion (Chung, Wright, & Charoenwang, 1998, 
1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Rajagoplan & Finkelstein, 1992) and.  
Given that compensation policies must be designed within the firm so as to 
reward the behavior of the firm’s TMG members, firm-level discretion will be the level of 
analysis of this study. Although never used in the context of TMG pay disparities, 
discretion has been used as a moderator to assess the extent to which executive 
characteristics affect both the framing of relevant outcomes and the outcomes themselves. 
For example, Carpenter & Golden (1997) found that perceived discretion was related to 
managerial power in a sample of practicing managers and advanced MBA students. And, 
in a test of managerial discretion as a determinant of CEO compensation, Finkelstein & 
Boyd (1998) found that CEO compensation was positively related to the degree of 
discretion enjoyed by the CEO.  
 Given that discretion has been found to moderate the relationship between CEO 
actions and strategically relevant firm outcomes, it is hypothesized that firm-level 
discretion will moderate the hypothesized relationship between each of the individual 
measures of CEO power and TMG pay disparities. Hence, the following hypotheses are 
offered: 
Hypothesis 8a: Managerial discretion will strengthen the relationship between 
CEO duality (structural power) and TMG pay disparities. 
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Hypothesis 8b: Managerial discretion will strengthen the relationship between 
the interdependent directors on the board of directors (structural power) and 
TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 8c: Managerial discretion will strengthen the relationship between a 
CEO’s tenure in the position (structural power) and TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 8d: Managerial discretion will strengthen the relationship between 
the proportion of outstanding shares held by the CEO (ownership power) and 
TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 8e: Managerial discretion will strengthen the relationship between the 
CEO’s status as founder or member of the founding family (ownership power) 
and TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 8f: Managerial discretion will strengthen the relationship between the 
External Boards the CEO sits on (prestige power) and TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 8g: Managerial discretion will strengthen the relationship between 
the CEO’s elite education status (prestige power) and TMG pay disparities. 
 
3.6 Moderating Role of TMG Relative Power 
 In that senior executives will be compelled to compete for the CEO’s title via 
sequential elimination tournaments there is reason to hypothesize that rivals to the 
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incumbent CEO have both the motivation and capacity to mitigate incumbent CEO power 
(under certain conditions). In as much, it may be expected that rivals in the TMG may 
work to limit the capacity of the incumbent CEO to consume a disproportionately large 
share of the TMG’s compensation resources. This argument has theoretical basis in the 
concept of monitoring by senior executives. Fama (1980) argued that managerial 
monitoring may take place in two directions: from the perspective of the board of 
directors and from the perspective of lower levels of management.  
Monitoring from lower levels of management can occur for two reasons (Zhang, 
2006). First, as has been argued in earlier sections of this dissertation, interest conflicts 
between the CEO and other members of the TMG may obtain as a function of the 
tournament mechanism, itself. A primary cause of interest conflicts and competition 
among members of the TMG lies in their desire to ascend to the office of the CEO and the 
attainment of the power and privileges that accompany such success (Shen & Cannella, 
Jr., 2002). That is, as senior executives move up the corporate hierarchy, the desire to 
become CEO, and to run the company, becomes even stronger (Pfeffer, 1981). Second, 
rival members of the TMG have a personal stake in the success of the firm. The external 
labor market evaluates their performance on the basis of the firm’s performance (Fama, 
1980). In as much, poor financial performance may suggest low levels of competence to 
potential employers thereby limiting alternative employment opportunities (Zhang, 
2006). Further, poor performance increases the likelihood that a new CEO will be 
selected from outside the firm. Such external succession may result in the replacement of 
other members of the TMG.   
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The interest conflicts and competition among rival members of the TMG put the 
CEO at risk of power contests (Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002). While 
research regarding the relative power of non-CEO members of the TMG has not been 
systematically undertaken, some empirical support for this perspective exists. For 
example, citing the contestation of CEO power as an explanatory perspective in a sample 
of 347 large U.S. corporations, Shen & Cannella, Jr. (2002) found the proportion of non-
CEO inside directors and the equity ownership of non-CEO members of the TMG both to 
be positively linked with CEO dismissal followed by inside succession although neither 
was related to CEO dismissal followed by outside succession. And, in a related finding, 
Zhang (2006) found that the presence of a separate COO/president counteracts the 
incumbent CEO’s power. In situations where a separate COO/president is present, the 
CEO is more likely to be dismissed under conditions of poor financial performance. 
Zhang (2006) asserts that this finding shows that a separate COO/president may become 
a rival to the CEO. 
In that the relative power of non-CEO members of the TMG has been shown to 
act as a factor that serves to limit incumbent CEO pursuit of personal interests, it is 
hypothesized that the relative power of non-CEO TMG members will moderate the 
hypothesized relationships between CEO power and TMG pay disparities. Hence, the 
following hypotheses are offered:  
Hypothesis 9a: The relative power of non-CEO TMG members will weaken the 
relationship between CEO duality (structural power) and TMG pay disparities. 
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Hypothesis 9b: The relative power of non-CEO TMG members will weaken the 
relationship between the interdependent directors on the board of directors 
(structural power) and TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 9c: The relative power of non-CEO TMG members will weaken the 
relationship between a CEO’s tenure in the position (structural power) and TMG 
pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 9d: The relative power of non-CEO TMG members will weaken the 
relationship between the proportion of outstanding shares held by the CEO 
(ownership power) and TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 9e: The relative power of non-CEO TMG members will weaken the 
relationship between the CEO’s status as founder or member of the founding 
family (ownership power) and TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 9f: The relative power of non-CEO TMG members will weaken the 
relationship between the External Boards the CEO sits on (prestige power) and 
TMG pay disparities. 
 
Hypothesis 9g: The relative power of non-CEO TMG members will weaken the 
relationship between the CEO’s elite education status (prestige power) and TMG 
pay disparities. 
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3.7 Performance Implications of TMG Vertical Pay Disparities 
 Economic Perspective. As was discussed in the literature review, the economic 
perspective ascribes performance-related benefits to TMG pay disparities. It is argued that 
such disparities will serve to motivate a higher level of performance among tournament 
participants resulting in the most qualified (or competitive) individual that exhibits the 
highest level of performance winning the CEO’s job. For instance, in a test of competing 
hypotheses, Main et al. (1993) found that wage-dispersing incentive structures enhance 
economic performance in a sample of U.S. corporations from 1980 to 1984. Eriksson 
(1999) found that a coefficient of variation in the difference in pay between the CEO and 
other contestants in the corporate tournament is positively associated with accounting 
profits. And, Hendrickson & Fredrickson (2001) found larger disparities in TMG pay to 
be associated with a higher return-on-assets (ROA) and a higher return-on-equity (ROE) 
in firms that are characterized by a higher level of related diversification (a proxy for 
firm-level collaboration and coordination needs).  
 Given the empirical results in the labor economics and strategic management 
literature found in support of normative tournament theory predictions, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 10: TMG pay disparities will be positively associated with subsequent 
financial performance. 
Behavioral Perspective. While the economic perspective has garnered some 
support, researchers have also documented negative performance implications to TMG 
pay disparities. The behavioral perspective predicts that large pay disparities among the 
TMG will result in a reduced capacity of the TMG to function as a coordinated unit 
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because pay disparity-induced cognitive dissonance will lead to perceptions of inequity 
and injustice regarding the rewards structure. For instance in a sample of 460 
organizations in 173 four-digit SIC codes over the years of 1992 to 1997, Bloom & 
Michel (2002) showed that pay disparities among the TMG have important implications 
for strategic decision-makers in that greater disparity in TMG pay leads to higher levels 
of managerial turnover and shorter tenure. Carpenter & Sanders (2004) found the gap 
between CEO and TMG member total pay to be negatively associated with subsequent 
financial performance (measured as the ratio of market-to-book value). And, Siegel & 
Hambrick (2005) found that TMG pay disparities tends to diminish collaboration by 
fostering competition for advancement to lucrative positions (via succession 
tournaments) within the TMG thereby resulting in lower subsequent financial 
performance. 
Given the empirical results in the strategic management literature found in 
support of the behavioral perspective, it is reasonable to hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 11: TMG pay disparities will be negatively associated with subsequent 
financial performance. 
Nonmonotonic Relationship. Empirical consensus regarding the performance 
implications of TMG pay disparities has been evasive. The relationship between TMG 
pay disparities and subsequent financial performance seems to be far more complex than 
either the economic or behavioral perspectives would argue (Bloom & Michel, 2002). 
While tournament theorists argue that tournaments facilitate higher levels of individual 
effort as competitors in corporate tournaments compete with one another in order to 
achieve the prize of the office of the CEO, researchers using a behavioral lens have been 
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able to show that such competition may have negative performance implications as 
excessive competition is likely to result in a reduced capacity to act in a coordinated 
fashion (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005)  or even sabotage among competitors (Dye, 1984).  
Equivocal findings suggest that organizational performance benefits may accrue 
to firms as a result of disparate TMG pay to a point as higher levels of individual 
performance result from individual competition with performance benefits to the firm. 
However, excessive individual competition is likely to result in higher levels of 
fragmentation among members of the TMG, to an inability to function as a cohesive unit 
in a coordinated fashion, and to lower levels of subsequent performance (Hambrick, 
1995). The integration of these competing perspectives implies that the TMG pay 
disparities and subsequent financial performance relationship is concave. Hence, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 12: TMG pay disparities and subsequent financial performance will 
have a concave relationship. 
3.8 Moderating Effects of Coordination Needs 
Defined as the "need for organizational subunits to intensively coordinate their 
activities to achieve peak performance" (e.g. Thompson, 1967), a TMG’s coordination 
needs indicate a need to collaborate, cooperate, and act interdependently in a way that has 
positive performance implications (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). One source of imposed 
coordination needs is the degree of volatility or unpredictability inherent in a focal firm’s 
industry. Empirically linked with uncertainty, industry dynamism imposes such a need in 
that members of TMGs are required to act in a more coordination fashion if their firms 
are to achieve adequate levels of performance  
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In their study of firms in dynamic environments, Eisenhardt & Bourgeois (1988) 
found that the constant change inherent in dynamic and volatile industry environments 
requires continuous negotiations, adjustments, and decisions among members of TMGs in 
ways that, if successful, lead to higher levels of performance. And, using intensiveness as 
a proxy for the coordination needs imposed by the dynamic nature of the technology 
industry, Siegel & Hambrick (2005) found that when compared to low technology firms, 
subsequent performance in high technology firms was more adversely affected when pay 
disparities exist within the TMG. The authors surmised that the performance 
consequences of pay disparities in technologically intensive industries is harmful because 
such disparities tend to result in lower levels of "collaboration by fostering competition 
for advancement to lucrative positions" (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005: 271). Further, and in 
support of this argument, Mueller, Mone, & Barker, III (2007) showed that political 
behavior in firms results in a degradation in the rational strategic decision-making 
process-a finding that was significant only in dynamic industries. Such degradation in 
strategic decision-making processes resulted in attending to issues that detracted from 
focusing on operational issues thereby resulting in missed opportunities and lower 
financial performance. In earlier work designed to illuminate the effects of political 
behavior in TMGs, Hambrick (1995) argued that fragmentation in top management 
groups is maladaptive in that it results in a reduced capacity to formulate and implement 
strategic changes designed to adapt to changes in the environment.  
Given the aforementioned arguments, it is hypothesized that greater coordination 
needs will be higher in relatively dynamic industry contexts. Further, it is expected that 
lower levels of coordination and interdependence will result from relatively high levels of 
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TMG pay disparities with deleterious effects to subsequent financial performance. Hence, 
it is reasonable to hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 13: Greater coordination needs arising in dynamic environments will 
negatively influence the relationship between TMG pay disparities and 
subsequent financial performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
 In this chapter I will introduce the methods to be used in the analysis of the 
theoretical model developed in chapter 3. I will first discuss the unit of analysis of this 
study (the TMG) with a focus on demonstrating how the TMG will be operationalized. 
The chapter will then lay out the sampling techniques to be used with a specific focus on 
data collection, the sampling frame, and sample size. The chapter will then move into a 
discussion of the measures to be used in the analyses followed by the analytical 
techniques to be used to test the validity of the research model.  
 4.1 Unit of Analysis: The TMG 
 One issue that concerns researchers is the definition of the TMG (Hambrick, 
1995). Conceptually, the TMG consists of the CEO and other members of the dominant 
coalition (Cyert & March, 1963). Researchers have used a range of operationalizations. 
For instance, Siegel & Hambrick (2005) identified all officers of the firm who were in the 
top three levels of the firm’s hierarchy as members of the TMG. Fredrickson & Iaquinto 
(1989) asked CEOs to identify the members of their TMGs.   
Like other studies in TMG pay and pay disparities research (e.g. Carpenter & 
Sanders, 2004; Main et al., 1993; Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001), this dissertation 
will operationalize the TMG as the CEO and the top four highest paid executives listed in 
the firm’s proxy statements. There are two main reasons for this approach. First, in 
accordance with tournament theory and previous work on the contestation of power as 
cited earlier in this dissertation, it is the members of the dominant coalition that occupy 
the hierarchical level just below the CEO (e.g. the COO) 
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that are most likely to be rivals. Secondly, the SEC requires public companies to disclose 
the compensation of its CEO and the four other highest-paid executives in the firm. 
While reports of compensation is scrutinized and legitimized by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, data for the other managers in the firm is not always reported 
(Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001).  
4.2 Research Design  
Several relationships that have never been analyzed in the strategic management 
literature will be analyzed in this dissertation. For example, to my knowledge, no study 
has incorporated multiple measures of CEO power as antecedents of TMG pay 
disparities. Further, this will be the first study to test the moderating effects of  firm-level 
discretion and relative non-CEO TMG power as mitigating conditions of the 
hypothesized CEO power/TMG pay disparities relationship. In an effort to explicate 
hypothesized associations, I use a large cross-sectional design with appropriate time-lags 
to allow for the detection of causal relationships. Although a pure longitudinal design 
might provide stronger support for causal relationships, there are several benefits to this 
approach. First, the proposed theoretical model is complex and is replete with 
relationships that have not yet been tested in the extant literature. In as much, a cross-
sectional design should explicate important information about the associations that exist 
between exogenous and endogenous variables.  
Several steps are undertaken in the research design to allow for inference (Kline, 
2005). First, time precedence is specified theoretically, and operationalized using time 
lags in the exogenous and endogenous variables of interest. Second, the direction of 
causality is specified based on extant theory and empirical findings. Lastly, several 
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control variables (those identified in the extant literature) have been specified so as to 
limit the possibility that the theorized relationships between exogenous and endogenous 
variables disappear when covariates are, otherwise, absent from the model. In comparison 
to a longitudinal design, this research design lacks only the capacity to identify the 
temporal stability of theorized relationships. Additionally, cross-sectional designs are 
routinely used in the CEO and TMG pay literature (e.g. Finkelstein & Boyd, 1994; Siegel 
& Hambrick, 2005).  
4.3 Data Collection 
Issues regarding the measurement of power have served to limit the extent to 
which research on executive power has been conducted (Pfeffer, 1981). Using perceptual 
measures of power might allow the investigator to access power at its source by tapping 
into the cognitions of those executives who operate in a power-laden context. However, 
using perceptual measures of power has its shortcomings. Power is a sensitive subject 
both in the business press and in the academic literature (Pfeffer, 1981). Using perceptual 
measures assumes that actors in the socio-political context both know about the 
distribution of power across groups and are willing to divulge information about the 
distribution of power (Pfeffer, 1981). Neither of these conditions is testable, empirically. 
In light of the potential problems associated with the use of perceptual measures 
of power, Pfeffer (1981) argued that individual and representational measures of power 
be developed so as to allow investigators to assess power objectively and in an 
unintrustive manner. Addressing the need for objective indicators of power, Finklestein 
(1992) developed a multidimensional measurement typology using a variety of 
indicators. Three studies were conducted in order to validate his multidimensional model 
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of power. In the first study, Finkelstein used perceptual measures of power based on 
responses from top executives and inside board members to dimensionalize executive 
power. In doing so, he was able to establish both reliability and discriminant validity. In 
the second study, top managers were asked to rate the dimensions of power in their own 
firms. Convergent validity was established when perceptual measures of power were 
mapped onto individual objective indicators of power. Finkelstein then strengthened the 
validity of power as a multidimensional construct by testing for predictive validity.  
This dissertation follows in the tradition of Finkelstein (1992) in that objective 
measures of power drawn from archival sources were used to assess power and how it is 
distributed across TMGs. The primary source of compensation, power, personal 
characteristics, and firm-level discretion data was company proxy statements and 10-Ks 
because they must meet stringent SEC reporting requirements allowing for the accurate 
provision of sensitive strategic, financial, and compensation data. Where necessary, 
secondary data sources were used. Such sources included the ExecuComp database, and 
the following sources of data as made available in the Lexis-Nexis Academic database: 
Who’s Who in Finance and Industry, SGA Executive Tracker, InfoUSA idEXEC, the U.S. 
Exec Comp Database, and Executive Bios. Lastly, Compustat served as the primary 
source of firm performance industry dynamism data.  
4.4 Sampling Frame and Minimum Sample Size 
To test the proposed theoretical model, data was collected from a cross-section of 
public companies randomly selected from the companies listed in the S&P 1500. The 
reasons for the choice of this sample are fourfold. First, large publicly-traded firms often 
have disperse ownership structures. In as much, they are contextually accurate targets 
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because the separation of ownership from control is a necessary condition of an agency 
relationship. Further, the literature has shown that dispersed ownership is associated with 
agency problems. Second, firms must be relatively large because the use of corporate 
tournaments implies the presence of multiple hierarchical levels in which a relatively 
large number of individuals compete up through the ranks in an attempt to reach the level 
of CEO. Third, firms should be public because sensitive information like financial data 
and the compensation of TMG members is not readily available for private firms. Fourth, 
archival data from proxy statements and databases like Compustat and ExecuComp have 
been shown to yield highly reliable and valid measures (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
Unlike other company lists (e.g. Fortune 500), which use firm size as a singular 
eligibility criterion, companies listed in the S&P 1500 Index meet stringent eligibility 
criteria that justify the use of such companies in this study (Standard & Poor’s, 2007). 
First, they are a cross-section of small, medium, and large companies on the basis of 
market capitalization. Second, they are public in that at least 50% of company stock is 
characterized as public float. Third, they are financially viable with at least four 
consecutive quarters of positive reported earnings. Lastly, they are operating companies 
that are domiciled in the United States. That is, there are no closed-end funds, holding 
companies, investment vehicles, or royalty trusts listed in the S&P 1500. Simple random 
sampling were was in order to construct the sample. Simple random sampling allows that 
each company in the S&P 1500 has the same chance of being selected thereby reducing 
non-random error and increasing validity.  
Recently, the average sample size of executive research was 152 observations 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). In order to achieve statistical power of β = .8 at a α = 
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.05 level of significance, Joreskog & Sorbom (1993) suggest using the following equation 
to determine the minimum sample size, n(n – 1)/2, where n = the number of manifest 
variables in the model. Including all control variables present in the research framework, 
the number of manifest variables in the conceptual model is 30. Hence, the minimum 
sample size required is 435 observations ((30(29))/2). Randomly selecting from the S&P 
1500 exceeds this minimum. A relatively large sample size reduces sampling error 
(Kline, 2005), limits departures from multivariate normality, and yields relatively greater 
statistical power, ceterus paribus, allowing that a false null hypothesis to be correctly 
rejected while a true null hypothesis might not be rejected (MacCallum, Browne, & 
Sugawara, 1996). Random sampling from the S&P 1500 yielded a sample of 676 firms. 
After applying inclusion constraints regarding the presence of the CEO in both 2004 
(year in which power is theorized to effect TMG Pay Disparities) and 2005 (year in which 
TMG Pay Disparities is theorized to reflect CEO Power in prior year) the sample size was 
reduced to 607 firms. As is shown in Table 4.2, the sample of 607 firms is drawn from 59 
different economic sectors (at the 2-digit SIC Code level) with business services firms 
being most highly represented (54) followed by chemical and allied products firms (46), 
and electronic, electrical equipment and components firms (42).  
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Table 4.4: Sectors Represented in the Original Sample (N=607) 
 
 
Sector Code Sector Description Count
10 Metal Mining 2
12 Coal Mining 2
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 23
14 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 2
15 Building Cnstrctn - General Contractors & Operative Builders 7
16 Heavy Cnstrctn, Except Building Construction - Contractors 1
17 Construction - Special Trade Contractors 2
20 Food and Kindred Products 14
21 Tobacco Products 2
22 Textile Mill Products 2
23 Apparel, Finished Prdcts from Fabrics & Similar Materials 5
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 4
25 Furniture and Fixtures 5
26 Paper and Allied Products 8
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 11
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 46
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 3
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 5
31 Leather and Leather Products 3
33 Primary Metal Industries 13
34 Fabricated Metal Prdcts, Except Machinery & Transport Eqpmnt 5
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 31
36 Electronic, Elctrcl Eqpmnt & Cmpnts, Excpt Computer Eqpmnt 42
37 Transportation Equipment 12
38 Mesr/Anlyz/Cntrl Instrmnts; Photo/Med/Opt Gds; Watchs/Clocks 31
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 8
40 Railroad Transportation 4
42 Motor Freight Transportation 5
44 Water Transportation 2
45 Transportation by Air 1
47 Transportation Services 4
48 Communications 10
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 26
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 19
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 8
52 Building Matrials, Hrdwr, Garden Supply & Mobile Home Dealrs 2
53 General Merchandise Stores 7
54 Food Stores 4
55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 3
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 11
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores 7
58 Eating and Drinking Places 13
59 Miscellaneous Retail 9
60 Depository Institutions 37
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 5
62 Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Services 6
63 Insurance Carriers 25
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 15
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 1
72 Personal Services 1
73 Business Services 54
75 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking 2
78 Motion Pictures 3
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 6
80 Health Services 11
82 Educational Services 2
83 Social Services 1
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management & Related Svcs 7
99 Conglomerates 4
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 The following section identifies the measures that were used to test the proposed 
theoretical model.  
4.5 Independent Variables 
 Following chapter 3, which introduced CEO Power as the main theoretical 
construct, the following section introduces a number of indicators designed to explicate 
the effect that different sources of CEO Power will have on TMG Pay Disparities.  
Theorized relationships with TMG Pay Disparities were evaluated individually for each 
indicator using path analysis. However, because I expected that indicators would 
correlate and form distinct dimensions of a CEO Power construct (see chapter 3), I also 
used structured equation modeling techniques (confirmatory factor analysis) to determine 
whether the individual measures of CEO Power mapped onto broader dimensions (e.g. 
Structural Power, Ownership Power, Prestige Power). Then, TMG Pay Disparities was 
regressed onto these latent constructs using latent regression. Introduction of the 
measures that were used in the analyses follows.  
4.5.1 Structural Power  
Structural Power is based on a CEO’s hierarchical position and refers to the 
power that is based on formal position in the organization’s social system (e.g. Brass & 
Burkhardt, 1993; D’Aveni & Kessner, 1993; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992). 
Three items were used as proxies of a CEO’s Structural Power-CEO Duality, 
Interdependent Directors on the board, and CEO Tenure (position).  
CEO Duality is a dual leadership structure that allows for the centralization of 
power in the dual CEO/Board Chairperson. CEO Duality is measured by determining 
whether the CEO is both the company’s CEO and Board Chairperson. This measure is 
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binary and was coded ‘1’ if the CEO also occupied the position of Board Chairperson and 
‘0’ otherwise (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Harrison et al., 1988; 
Pollock & Fisher, 2002).  
One way to examine the CEO’s Structural Power vis-a-vis the board of directors 
is by examining the proportion of interdependent directors that serve on the board (Daily 
& Dalton, 1994). Interdependent directors are directors who were appointed during the 
incumbent CEO’s tenure. As such, they are more likely to be individuals with whom the 
CEO feels comfortable, approved of, and who feel loyalty to the CEO for their 
appointments. Interdependent Directors is a continuous measure that is a measure of the 
number of board members that were appointed during the incumbent CEO’s tenure 
divided by the size of the board (Core et al., 1999; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Daily & 
Johnson, 1997; Lambert et al., 1993).  
The time spent in office serves to institutionalize CEO power. CEO Tenure is a 
continuous measure that will be measured as the number of years a CEO has held the 
position. In order to identify only those contexts in which the CEO had a likely effect on 
the structure and distribution of the TMG’s compensation only firms run by CEOs that 
had > 1 year in the position were included in the sample.  
Data for these measures of structural power were collected from company proxy 
statements for year t-2.  
4.5.2 Ownership Power 
Ownership Power is based on the power that accrues to the CEO as a function of 
being a member of the founding family and/or the proportion of shares owned by the 
CEO (Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). 
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Two items were used as measures of a CEO’s Ownership Power- Equity Shares Held - 
CEO, and Founder Status, which signifies the CEO’s status as company founder or as a 
member of the founding family.  
Power accrues to CEOs who have relatively high ownership in direct comparison 
to that of shareholders. Equity Shares Held - CEO is a continuous measure of the number 
of shares held by the CEO divided by the total number of the company’s outstanding 
shares (Barkema & Pennings, 1998; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1989).  
A CEO’s status as founder or as a member of the founding family is an indication 
of the CEO’s capacity to gain power through long-term interaction with the board 
(Finkelstein, 1992) and to gain personal power due to relatively high levels of 
commitment, enhanced entrepreneurial and technical skills, and stronger personal ties 
with employees and board members (Carroll, 1984). Founder Status is a binary measure 
and was coded as ‘1’ if the CEO is either the founder of the company or a member of the 
founding family, and ‘0’ otherwise.  
Data for these measures of ownership power were collected, primarily, from 
company proxy statements, and from secondary sources where necessary. All data were 
collected for year t-2.  
4.5.3 Prestige Power 
Prestige Power emanates from a CEO’s capacity to facilitate the absorption of 
uncertainty from the institutional environment by acquiring information from other 
members of the managerial or educational elite through interpersonal linkages that 
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convey high status (D’Aveni & Kessner, 1993; Finkelstein, 1992). Two items were used 
to measure Prestige Power-Elite Education and External Boards.  
One measure of CEO Prestige Power is the number of corporate boards on which 
the CEO sits, which has been shown to convey the power necessary to block the 
punishment for poor performance that arises both internally and externally. External 
Boards is a continuous measure of the number of corporate boards on which the 
incumbent CEO sits.  
Attendance at certain schools conveys an aura of prominence in the corporate 
elite. Membership in this elite is theorized to provide linkages with executives at other 
firms allowing an incumbent CEO to forge alliances with other powerful members of the 
corporate elite. As was argued in chapter 3, candidates for corporate governance positions 
often come from this group thereby indicating that CEOs with elite educational 
backgrounds may be more powerful than other members of the TMG. Elite Education is 
measured by examining the level of the CEO’s education and attendance at a prestigious 
institution.  
Following Finkelstein (1992), this variable is polytomized, and was coded as ‘1’ 
if the CEO had no college degree, ‘2’ if no degree(s) was/were from an elite institution, 
‘3’ if one undergraduate or graduate degree, but not both, was from an elite institution, 
and ‘4’ if both undergraduate and graduate degrees were from elite institutions.  
Data for both measures of Prestige Power were collected, primarily, from 
company proxy statements, and from secondary sources, as needed. Data were collected 
for year t-2.  
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4.6 Moderators 
4.6.1 Managerial Discretion 
 Managerial Discretion may be operationalized at the industry, firm, and individual 
levels of analyses (Boyd & Gove, 2007). As suggested earlier in this dissertation, 
Managerial Discretion was operationalized at the firm level of analyses. Data for several 
different measures of discretion were collected. I expected these measures to moderate 
the relationship between CEO Power and TMG Pay Disparities. Use of each of the 
measures used have been validated in the literature as representative of managerial 
discretion (e.g. Chung et al., 1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Jensen, 1986; Wright & 
Kroll, 2002). Capital Intensity was operationalized as the value of total property as well 
as plant and equipment divided by total revenues. Advertising Intensity was 
operationalized as the firm’s advertising expenditures divided by total revenues. R&D 
Intensity was operationalized as the firm’s investments in R&D divided by total 
revenues. And, Financial Slack was operationalized as the firm’s ratio of cash and short-
term securities divided by the book value of total assets.  
Data for the firm-level discretion were collected for year t-2 from the Compustat 
database.  
4.6.2 Relative TMG Power  
In accordance with the arguments of tournament theory and internal governance 
mechanisms, inside directors often desire the position of CEO and its associated 
privileges. Hence, the relative power of the non-CEO members of the TMG: Proportion 
of Inside Directors, TMG Equity Shares Held, and the presence of a Separate COO may 
serve to limit the capacity of incumbent CEOs to act with unmitigated power.  
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Following, Shen & Cannella, Jr. (2002), the Proportion of Inside Directors was 
calculated as the number of directors who are current members of the firm’s TMG 
(excluding the CEO) divided by the total number of directors on the board (Daily, 
Johnson, & Dalton, 1999).  
Just as Ownership Power accrues to the CEO in obverse to that of other 
shareholders, Equity Shares Held - TMG was expected to accrue to the non-CEO TMG 
members in obverse to the CEO as a function of their aggregate equity ownership. Equity 
Shares Held – TMG was be calculated as the number of firm’s outstanding shares held by 
all non-CEO members of the TMG divided by total company shares outstanding (Shen & 
Cannella, Jr., 2002).  
The non-CEO members of the TMG may be often considered to be rivals to the 
incumbent CEO. Because the Chief Operating Officer (COO) often takes on the role of 
general manager in charge of internal managerial issues, the COO may be considered to 
be most likely to rival the incumbent CEO for the top job (Zhang, 2006). Following 
Hambrick & Cannella, Jr. 2004) and Zhang (2006), Separate COO was coded as ‘1’ if 
there was a member of the TMG, other than the CEO that held the title of President or 
COO or both, and ‘0’ otherwise.  
The data for these measures of relative TMG power was collected, primarily, form 
company proxy statements, and from secondary sources, where necessary.  All data for 
TMG Relative Power was collected for year t-2.  
4.6.3 Coordination Needs 
Coordination Needs was be proxied by industry dynamism, or the volatility in the 
industry environment, which has been shown to impact relationships between a TMG’s 
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capacity to act with coordinated action and firm performance. Adapted from Dess & 
Beard (1984), industry dynamism has been defined as the instability of industry sales 
over time (Boyd & Gove, 2007; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Mueller et al., 2007). Following 
Keats & Hitt (1988) industry dynamism was operationalized as antilog of the regression 
slope coefficient from the following growth equation: 
Yt = b0 + b1t + εt, where 
y = aggregate industry net sales  
t = year, and  
ε = residual 
Aggregate industry net sales data were collected for the 5-year period 2001-2005 
(20 quarters of sales data) for 233 industries (4-digit SIC). Data for Industry Dynamism 
were collected from the Compustat database.   
4.7. Dependent Variables 
4.7.1 TMG Pay Disparities  
Following several researchers of TMG pay disparities (e.g. Bloom & Michel, 
2002; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001; Lambert et al., 
1993; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005), the measure for TMG Pay Disparities was based on 
total compensation, which included both short-term and long-term components awarded 
in the focal year (t-1). Short-term compensation included salary and bonus. Long-term 
compensation included the value of stock options, performance unit plans, and restricted 
stock (Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001; Lambert et al., 1993; Hendrickson & 
Fredrickson, 2001).  
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Following Lambert et al. (1993) and Hendrickson & Fredrickson (2001), the 
components of long-term pay was valued as follows: (1) stock options was valued at 25% 
of their exercise price (this procedure produces values in the same range as the Black-
Scholes valuation method); (2) performance unit grants was valued by multiplying the 
number of performance units by their respective target  values (prospective) or by the 
actual payout (retrospective); (3) restricted stock was valued by multiplying the number 
of shares by the share price on the date of the grant.   
Following Siegel & Hambrick (2005), Hendrickson & Fredrickson (2001), and 
Carpenter & Sanders (2004), TMG Pay Disparities was calculated as the difference 
between total CEO compensation and the average of the total compensation paid to the 
other members of the TMG. Data were collected from company proxy statements and the 
ExecuComp database, where necessary.   
4.7.2 Subsequent Financial Performance  
Following TMG pay disparities researchers (e.g. Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; 
Siegel & Hambrick, 2005), Subsequent Financial Performance was measured using 
measures of market (Market-to-Book Value or “MTB”) and accounting performance 
(Return-on-Assets or “ROA”). A firm’s MTB value is a valid measure of market-
anticipated growth opportunities. This ratio measures the value that the market expects to 
be extracted by the firm from its pool of tangible and intangible resources (Carpenter & 
Sanders, 2004). MTB value was measured by dividing the market value of the firm by the 
book value of the firm at the end of the year (t) following the measure of TMG Pay 
Disparities (t-1). ROA is an accounting-based profitability measure that reflects the firm’s 
profitability. ROA was calculated as net income divided by total assets. Each measure 
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was industry-normed by using the difference of MTB/ROA and industry-average 
MTB/ROA, respectively. Financial performance data were drawn from the Compustat 
database for year t. 
4.8 Control Variables 
 Several control variables were included in the analyses. Control variables 
incorporated firm-level factors that have been shown to affect TMG Pay Disparities and 
financial performance. With the expectation that TMG Pay Disparities would be lower in 
smaller firms (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005), Firm Size was measured as the firm’s sales 
(Carpenter & Sanders, 2004). It is likely that larger firms would be structured around 
multiple business units with firms more likely to motivate executives using pay-for-
performance incentives designed around corporate tournaments. Prior Financial 
Performance served as a measure of the firm’s ex ante financial health and performance. 
Both measures (MTB and ROA) of Prior Financial Performance were industry-normed in 
the same manner as the dependent variable measured in year t. The firm’s MTB/ROA 
value in year t-1 were measured as the difference between MTB/ROA and industry 
MTB/ROA (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). Industry-relative Pay Level was used to control 
for industry pay practices that shape the level of firm pay. This measure was calculated 
by taking the ratio of the TMG member’s pay to the median of all TMG members in the 
focal company’s industry. Following Bloom & Michel (2002), separate medians were 
calculated for CEOs and non-CEO TMG members. The number of contestants in the 
corporate tournament was controlled for using the number of Vice Presidents in the firm. 
A larger number of tournament contestants is indicative of a larger corporate tournament, 
and may result in a larger disproportionate pay increase between the level of CEO and the 
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next level down (Conyon et al., 2001; Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001; Main et al., 
1993). 
4.9 Data Analysis 
 Analyses occurred in four steps. Hypotheses were tested on a preliminary basis 
using OLS regression. Hypotheses were then tested using mediated recursive path 
analysis in LISREL 8.72. Path analysis is a powerful analytical tool that is well-suited to 
the evaluation of complex models such as the one in this dissertation (Schumm, 
Southerly, & Figley, 1980). Path analysis using LISREL 8.72 provides for the use of 
maximum likelihood estimation, which is a full-information estimation method that 
estimates parameters of all relationships in the model simultaneously. Path analyses was 
followed by a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) that was used to identify and 
distinguish multidimensional latent constructs that are comprised of the individual 
measures included in the path analyses. For example, path analysis tested the effect of 
individual measures of power (e.g. Elite Education, External Boards) on TMG Pay 
Disparities. Through CFA, however, I examined individual measures of CEO Power for 
their convergence on broader dimension of CEO Power: Structural Power, Ownership 
Power, and Prestige Power. Upon identification of a valid structural model, latent 
regression was performed using the latent constructs identified in the CFA. Doing so, 
served to establish causal relationships between latent constructs.  
One of the main benefits of using structured equation modeling techniques in 
LISREL 8.72 is that doing so allows for the correction of measurement error while 
providing a greater amount of information regarding model fit than does multiple 
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regression in that several indices of model fit are provided as a gestalt (e.g. Χ2, RMSEA, 
CFI, NFI, SRMR, NNFI, etc.).  
 In this chapter, I described how the study was designed in order to test the 
theoretical model and hypotheses that were developed in chapter 3. I addressed how the 
TMG was to be operationalized, what data sources were used to collect data, how 
measures were constructed, and the sample size that was used in analyses. In the next 
chapter, I discuss how the model and hypotheses were tested, and the results that emerged 
from statistical tests.  
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 Primary data analysis was performed in three stages. First, all of the data were 
screened for accuracy, normality, and missingness. Where necessary nonlinear 
transformations were made to variables with distributions that diverged from normality, 
but only in cases where such transformations resulted in closer approximations to 
normality. Missing data were imputed using the multiple imputation technique. Next, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to conduct preliminary tests of study 
hypotheses and to establish a statistical basis for the specification of the path model. 
Second, I conducted a path analysis to evaluate the specified theoretical model and the 
related hypotheses developed in chapter 3. Third, I evaluated the individual CEO Power 
measures for the possibility that they would converge onto broader dimensions of CEO 
Power (as was discussed in chapter 4) using confirmatory factor analysis. And, last, I 
conducted a latent regression to determine the extent to which latent CEO Power 
constructs predicted TMG Pay Disparities. 
5.1 Missing Data 
 Within the data set of 607 cases there were several instances in which company-
specific or executive-specific data was not available from any of the data sources 
discussed in chapter 4. In fact, 7.2% of the data were missing at random (MAR).  
 The traditional approach to handling missing data in the strategic management 
literature is to use listwise deletion, whereas an entire case is excluded from analyses if it 
has missing data. Although popular, listwise deletion can cause two major problems: (1) 
severe loss of statistical power caused by a drastic reduction in the sample size; and, (2) 
biased parameter estimates. To this end, and along with other methods like pairwise 
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deletion, mean substitution, and regression-based single imputation, listwise deletion is 
regarded as an unacceptable manner in which to address missing data concerns (e.g. 
Graham, Cumsille, & Elek-Fisk, 2002; Little & Rubin, 1987). 
One of the more efficacious methods of handling missingn data is multiple imputation 
(Graham et al., 2002).  Multiple imputation avoids the problems associated with listwise 
deletion as it both preserves important distributional characteristics of the data and uses 
them to inform missing values. Multiple imputation is done using three basic steps. First, 
a random sample is drawn from complete responses taken in order to identify the 
distribution of the variable with missing data. Several random samples are then taken 
from the distribution of the variable with missing data to provide estimates of that 
variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Then, the missing values are then filled with 
different imputations to reflect different uncertainty levels thereby preserving important 
characteristics of the data set. 
As was noted by Graham et al. (2002) procedures such as multiple imputation are 
superior to listwise deletion because they yield unbiased and efficient parameter 
estimates. In accordance with this prescription for handling missing data, I imputed 
missing data using the multiple imputation method available in NORM 2.03.  
5.2 Data Screening and Descriptive Statistics 
To ensure the accuracy of the data set, data were screened through an examination 
of descriptive statistics, outliers, and graphical representations of variable distributions. 
Analyzing histograms of the variables in the data for extreme values and conducting a 
Cook’s D test of multivariate outliers (values > 1.0) allowed me to identify 3 multivariate 
outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Although preliminary tests suggested that the 
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outliers did not cause significant changes in model fit, parameter estimates, and 
significance levels of the variables of theoretical interest, the outliers were removed from 
the analyses. Hence, the final data set of 604 cases excluded UST, Inc., Hercules, Inc., 
and Lucent Technologies.  
 An examination of variable histograms, normality plots, and measures of variable 
skewness identified several variables with distributions that diverged from normality. 
Specifically, the following variables diverged from normality: Equity Shares Held - CEO, 
Equity Shares Held - TMG, CEO Tenure, Interdependent Directors, Firm Size, Industry-
relative Pay - CEO, Industry-relative Pay - TMG, Tournament Size, Financial Slack, and 
Capital Intensity. Following prescriptions made by Tabachnick & Fidell (2002) and 
others, nonlinear transformations were made in order to correct for nonnormality, but 
only when their distributions more closely approximated normality as a result. After 
adding “1” as a shift parameter, non-normality was addressed by making natural log 
transformations to the following variables: CEO Tenure, Interdependent Directors, Firm 
Size, Industry-relative Pay - CEO, Industry-relative Pay - CEO, and Tournament Size. In 
addition to making nonlinear transformations to the aforementioned variables, several 
linear transformations were made in order to aid with interpretation of the results. 
Specifically, TMG Pay Disparities was scaled by dividing by 1,000,000 while ROA 
(2005 and 2006), CEO Age, and the nonlinear transformation of Firm Size were all 
scaled by dividing by 10.  
 Table 5.1 reports the descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, and range) 
of all variables prior to the nonlinear transformations, but after having imputed missing 
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data. As can be seen in Table 5.1 the mean level of the dependent variables is $3,213,000, 
.409, and -1.04 for TMG Pay Disparities, ROA, and MTB, respectively.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N=604) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
CEO Duality .000 1.000 .654 .476
Interdependent directors a .000 3.000 .466 .292
CEO Tenure a .000 53.040 7.423 7.651
CEO Shares Held .000 .5002 .0232 .063
Founder Status -.021 1.000 .135 .341
Elite Education 1.000 4.000 2.242 .829
External Boards -1.790 8.000 1.085 1.403
TMG Pay Disparities b -5.051 38.023 3.213 4.617
Market-to-Book value (2006) -62.468 32.009 -1.005 4.943
Return-on-Assets (2006) -86.412 39.891 .409 7.4250
Separate COO .000 1.000 .093 .290
Proportion of Insiders on Board .000 1.000 .161 .098
TMG Shares Held .000 .26264 .007 .021
Financial Slack .000 .794 .151 .177
R&D Intensity -.305 1.276 .048 .120
Capital Intensity .004 3.200 .421 .581
Advertising Intensity -.060 .284 .026 .035
Industry Dynamism .001 .722 .028 .040
Industry-relative Pay Level – 
CEO a  
-.388 12.373 1.501 1.656
Industry-relative Pay Level - 
TMG a 
-.108 17.643 1.510 1.6322
Firm Size a b .000 3.133E5 7.112E3 2.229E4
Tournament Size a .000 43.000 6.431 4.169
CEO Age 37.000 89.000 55.774 7.230
Market-to-Book Value (2005) -27.450 74.334 .168 5.379
Return-on-Assets (2005) -65.069 124.925 11.247 22.518
a Values of variables prior to nonlinear transformation; b Millions of U.S. Dollars 
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The correlations among the study variables are reported in Table 5.2. Among the 
independent variables of theoretical interest, the highest correlation (.488) exists between 
Financial Slack and R&D Intensity (both measures of Managerial Discretion). The 
potential for multicollinearity problems between independent variables will be addressed 
in subsequent sections. 
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Table 5.2: Variable Correlations (N=604) 
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5.3 Treatment of Moderators and Quadratic Terms 
 The theoretical model specifies the testing of relationships involving several 
product terms. Specifically, Managerial Discretion, TMG Relative Power, Industry 
Dynamism, and the quadratic term of TMG Pay Disparities are all variables of theoretical 
interest. One method that is commonly used to construct product terms is mean-centering.  
While mean-centering is useful in some circumstances, mean-centered product terms can 
be collinear with their component variables when those variables have distributions that 
diverge from normality (Lance, 1988). A more conservative approach to constructing 
product terms is to orthogonalize the product terms vis-à-vis their component variables 
by centering the residuals of the component variables. This approach controls for 
correlation between component variables and their product terms, and mitigates 
collinearity (Lance, 1988). All product terms analyzed in this study have been 
orthogonalized using the residual centering method. 
Of note is that only two of the Managerial Discretion variables were consistently 
significant in preliminary analyses. While both R&D Intensity and Financial Slack are 
significant in a number of models, Capital Intensity and Advertising Intensity are never 
significant. Hence, they are left out of subsequent analyses. Additionally, R&D Intensity 
and Financial Slack are highly correlated at .488 (p < .01). To mitigate problems 
associated with collinearity and to aid in the interpretation of results from subsequent 
analyses R&D Intensity and Financial Slack were combined into a composite Managerial 
Discretion score by standardizing each variable by its mean and then averaging the two. 
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5.4 Preliminary Regression Analysis 
   
 In order to better specify the path model, several regression models were run prior 
to conducting the path analysis in LISREL 8.72. While path analysis in LISREL 8.72 is 
superior in testing complex theoretical models (see Chapter 4 for a discussion), OLS 
regression analysis is useful in that it provides preliminary tests of the hypotheses and 
informs path analysis regarding which control variables should be included in the 
analysis of the path model.  
 Given that the theoretical model includes multiple dependent variables (e.g. TMG 
Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance), analyses were conducted in 
three steps. First, TMG Pay Disparities was regressed onto multiple indicators of CEO 
Power, and their interaction with Managerial Discretion and the proxies for TMG 
Relative Power (Hypotheses 1-9). Then, I examined the effects of TMG Pay Disparities, 
its orthogonalized squared term, and its interaction with Industry Dynamism on both 
measures of Subsequent Financial Performance (Hypotheses 10-13).  
Table 5.4.1 Results of OLS Regression: TMG Pay Disparities onto CEO Power, 
Managerial Discretion, and TMG Relative Power (N=604) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Industry-relative Prior Performance .020    
CEO Age .042+    
Indusrty-relative Pay – CEO .859***    
Indusrty-relative Pay – TMG -.251***    
Firm Size .139***    
Tournament Size -.113***    
CEO Duality  -.019   
CEO Tenure  -.015   
Interdependent Directors  .053+   
CEO Shares Held  .072**   
Founder Status  .078**   
Elite Education  .022   
External Boards  -.026   
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CEO Duality X Prop. Of Insiders   .020  
CEO Duality X Separate COO   -.011  
CEO Duality X TMG Shares Held   .021  
CEO Tenure X Prop. Of Insiders   -.035  
CEO Tenure X Separate COO   .043  
CEO Tenure X TMG Shares Held   -.020  
Prop. Int. Dirs. X Prop. Of Insiders   -.016  
Prop. Int. Dirs. X Separate COO   .013  
Prop. Int. Dirs. X TMG Shares Held    .026  
CEO Shares Held X Prop. Of Insiders   .024  
CEO Shares Held X Separate COO   -.035  
CEO Shares Held X TMG Shares Held   .011  
Founder Status X Prop. Of Insiders   -.002  
Founder Status X Separate COO   -.019  
Founder Status X TMG Shares Held   -.029  
Elite Education X Prop. Of Insiders   .008  
Elite Education X Separate COO   .045  
Elite Education X TMG Shares Held   .018  
Number of Corporate Boards X Prop. Of 
Insiders 
  -.033  
Number of Corporate Boards X Separate 
COO 
  -.091**  
Number of Corporate Boards X TMG 
Shares Held 
  .206***  
Managerial Discretion X CEO Duality    .031 
Managerial Discretion X CEO Tenure    .008 
Managerial Discretion X Interdependent 
Directors 
   .009 
Managerial Discretion X CEO Shares 
Held 
   .054+ 
Managerial Discretion X Founder Status    -.063* 
Managerial Discretion X External Boards    -.014 
Managerial Discretion X Elite Education    -.003 
     
F-Change (Significance of Change Reported) 205.519*** .290 .258 .239 
Adjusted-R2 (Significance of Change Reported) .528 .541 .568 .567 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (1-tailed α) 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients reported for parsimony 
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5.4.1 CEO, TMG Power, Managerial Discretion on TMG Pay Disparities 
 In addition to the model with control variables only (Model 1), the results of the 
regression analyses examining the effect of individual measures of CEO Power, and the 
moderating effects of TMG Relative Power and Managerial Discretion are reported in 
Table 5.4.1. In Model 2 TMG Pay Disparities was regressed onto each of the individual 
measures of CEO Power. In Model 3, TMG Pay Disparities is regressed onto each of the 
Managerial Discretion moderators. And, in Model 4 TMG Pay Disparities is regressed 
onto each of the TMG Relative Power moderators. 
 In Model 1, I regressed TMG Pay Disparities onto five control variables. Of the 
five, four had significant effects on TMG Pay Disparities and in the expected direction. 
Specifically, the nonlinear transformations of Industry-relative Pay - CEO (p < .001), 
Industry-relative Pay – TMG (p < .001), Firm Size (p < .001) and Tournament Size (p < 
.001) were all both positively associated with TMG Pay Disparities as expected. 
However, CEO Age had a weak positive (p < .10) association with TMG Pay Disparities.  
 In Model 2, I regressed TMG Pay Disparities onto each of the individual measures 
of CEO Power. Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive association between CEO Duality and 
TMG Pay Disparities. However, the hypothesized relationship was statistically non-
significant. Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive association between Interdependent 
Directors and TMG Pay Disparities. As was hypothesized, hypothesis 2 was partially 
supported. The relationship was statistically significant (p < .10) and in the expected 
direction. Hypothesis 3 predicted a positive association between CEO Tenure and TMG 
Pay Disparities. Counter to what was expected the hypothesized relationship was not 
statistically significant. Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive association between Equity 
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Shares Held – CEO and TMG Pay Disparities. As expected, this relationship was 
statistically significant (p < .01). Hence, Hypothesis 4 was supported. Hypothesis 5 
predicted a positive association between Founder Status and TMG Pay Disparities. In 
support of Hypothesis 5, this relationship was statistically significant (p < .01) and in the 
expected direction. Hypothesis 6 tested the hypothesized relationship between External 
Boards and TMG Pay Disparities. Counter to what was expected this relationship was not 
statistically significant. The last test in this model was the test of Hypothesis 7 in which I 
examined the effect of Elite Education on TMG Pay Disparities. Counter to what was 
hypothesized this relationship was not statistically significant.  
 In Model 3, I regressed TMG Pay Disparities onto each of the hypothesized TMG 
Relative Power moderators (Inside Directors, Equity Shares Held - TMG, and Separate 
COO) of the hypothesized CEO Power and TMG Pay Disparities relationship 
(Hypotheses 9a-9g). Because the moderators have all been orthogonalized using the 
residual-centering method, only the interaction terms are included in the analyses. Of the 
twenty-one hypothesized moderators, only two are statistically significant. The presence 
of a Separate COO moderated (p < .01) the hypothesized External Boards and TMG Pay 
Disparities relationship (Hypothesis 9f) as expected (negative). And, Equity Shares Held 
– TMG moderated (p < .001) the hypothesized External Boards and TMG Pay Disparities 
relationship (Hypothesis 9f) although the sign of the beta coefficient was in the opposite 
direction (positive). 
In Model 4, I regressed TMG Pay Disparities onto each of the hypothesized 
Managerial Discretion moderators (Financial Slack, R&D Intensity, Capital Intensity, and 
Advertising Intensity) of the hypothesized CEO Power and TMG Pay Disparities 
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relationship (Hypotheses 8a-8g). Because the moderators have all been orthogonalized by 
using the residual-centering method, only the interaction terms are included in the 
analyses. Of the seven hypothesized moderators, only two are statistically significant. As 
was hypothesized, Managerial Discretion moderated (p < .10) the hypothesized Equity 
Shares Held – CEO and TMG Pay Disparities relationship (Hypothesis 8d) and in the 
expected direction (positive). Managerial Discretion also moderated (p < .05) the 
hypothesized Founder Status and TMG Pay Disparities relationship (Hypothesis 9e). 
However, the beta coefficient was in the opposite direction (negative).  
5.4.2 Subsequent Financial Performance on TMG Pay Disparities and Coordination 
Needs  
   In addition to the model with control variables only (Model 1), the results of the 
regression analyses examining the effect of TMG Pay Disparities, its quadratic term, and 
the moderating effects of Coordination Needs on Subsequent Financial Performance are 
reported in Table 5.4.2. In Model 2 Subsequent Financial Performance is regressed onto 
TMG Pay Disparities. In Model 3, Subsequent Financial Performance is regressed onto 
the quadratic term of TMG Pay Disparities. And, in Model 4 Subsequent Financial 
Performance is regressed onto the TMG Pay Disparities and Coordination Needs 
interaction term. Of note is that analysis is run alternatively with MTB and ROA as 
measures of Subsequent Financial Performance.  
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Table 5.4.2 Results of OLS Regression: Subsequent Financial Performance (ROA) 
onto TMG Pay Disparities, TMG Pay Disparities Squared, and Industry Dynamism 
(N=604) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Prior Performance (ROA) .298***    
Firm Size .041    
TMG Pay Disparities          .067+   
TMG Pay Disparities - Quadratic   -.162***  
TMG Pay Disparities X Industry 
Dynamism 
   -.051+ 
     
F-Change 29.841*** 2.447 16.194*** 1.761 
Adjusted-R2 .087 .090 .112 .113 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (1-tailed α);  
Standardized beta coefficients reported for parsimony. 
 
 In Model 1, I regressed Subsequent Financial Performance onto two control 
variables. Prior Financial Performance was statistically significant (p < .001) and in the 
expected direction (positive). While the sign of the beta coefficient of Firm Size was in 
the expected direction, the expected relationship was not statistically significant.  
 In Model 2, I regressed Subsequent Financial Performance onto TMG Pay 
Disparities. In a test of competing hypotheses, Hypothesis 10 (Economic Perspective) 
predicted a positive association between TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial 
Performance while Hypothesis 11 (Behavioral Perspective) predicted a negative 
association between TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance. 
Results support Hypothesis 10 albeit at the p < .10 level of significance.  
 In Model 3, I regressed Subsequent Financial Performance onto the quadratic 
term of TMG Pay Disparities. In Hypothesis 12 I argue that a concave relationship 
between TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance will obtain. A 
positive sign on the beta coefficient indicates that a convex relationship exists while a 
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negative sign indicates a concave relationship as is argued in Hypothesis 12. Results 
support Hypothesis 12 in that the relationship is statistically significant (p < .001), and 
with the expected sign (negative).  
In Model 4, I regressed Subsequent Financial Performance onto the Coordination 
Needs interaction term. In Hypothesis 13 I argued that Coordination Needs would 
interact with TMG Pay Disparities to precipitate lower levels of Subsequent Financial 
Performance. Results indicate that the beta coefficient has the expected negative sign 
although the relationship is significant only at the p < .10 level. Hence, while hypothesis 
13 is supported, it is only partially so. Figure 5.4.1 depicts the nonmonotonic nature of 
the relationship between Subsequent Financial performance and both the linear and 
quadratic components of TMG Pay Disparities.  
Figure 5.4.1 Results of OLS Regression: Nonmonotonic Relationship between 
Subsequent Financial Performance TMG Pay Disparities, and TMG Pay Disparities 
Squared (N=604) 
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The preceding discussion focuses on, and reports, analyses based on ROA as a 
measure of performance. It should be noted that none of the hypothesized TMG Pay 
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Disparities/Subsequent Financial Performance relationships rose to the level of 
significance when MTB was used as the measure of performance. In fact, only the prior 
performance control variable (MTB in 2005) was significant (see Table 5.4.3). 
Table 5.4.3 Results of OLS Regression: Subsequent Financial Performance (MTB) 
onto TMG Pay Disparities, TMG Pay Disparities Squared, and Industry Dynamism 
(N=604) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Prior Performance (MTB) .636***    
Firm Size .023    
TMG Pay Disparities          .019   
TMG Pay Disparities - Quadratic   -.017  
TMG Pay Disparities X Industry 
Dynamism 
   .015 
     
F-Change 205.519*** .290 .258 .239 
Adjusted-R2 .404 .403 .403 .402 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (1-tailed α);  
Standardized beta coefficients reported for parsimony 
5.5 Path Analysis of the Theoretical Model 
 Path analysis was used to test the validity of the theoretical model. As was 
discussed in chapter 4 there are several advantages in using this analytical technique. As 
a structured equation modeling (SEM) technique, path analysis (in LISREL 8.72) is a 
powerful analytical tool that is well-suited to the evaluation of complex models such as 
the one developed in chapter 3 (Schumm et al., 1980). Unlike multiple regression, ML 
estimation is a full-information estimation method that estimates parameters of all 
relationships in the model simultaneously. And, in addition to the significance testing of 
hypotheses, SEM programs like LISREL 8.72 provide several indices of model fit (e.g. 
Χ2, RMSEA, CFI, NFI, SRMR, NNFI, etc.). 
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Figure 5.5 Theoretical Path Model  
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Along with control variables, the modified saturated path model that relates to the 
13 hypotheses developed in chapter 3 is presented in Figure 5.5. The parameter estimates 
and goodness-of-fit indices are reported in Table 5.5.1. Several indices of overall model 
fit were calculated in order to assess the validity of the theoretical model. While the 
structured equation modeling literature offers many indices of model fit, Ridgon (2001) 
recommends that researchers pay special attention to three: (1) the chi-square (χ2) 
statistic, which provides a test of whether the sample covariance matrix is equivalent to 
the model-implied covariance matrix, (2) the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), which measures the discrepancy between the two matrices per degree of 
freedom, and (3) the comparative fit index (CFI), which compares the existing model fit 
with a null model whereas the variables are uncorrelated. In addition to these commonly 
used indices of model fit, I also computed and report the non-normed fit index (NNFI), 
which is one of the indices least affected by sample size. 
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Table 5.5.1 Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit Indices of Modified Saturated 
Path Model When ROA is the Measure of Subsequent Financial Performance 
(N=604) 
 Path Estimate t-value 
H1 CEO Duality → TMG Pay Disparities -.093 -.319 
H2 Interdependent Directors → TMG Pay Disparities 1.427 1.637 
H3 CEO Tenure→ TMG Pay Disparities -.186 .-.792 
H4 CEO Equity Shares → TMG Pay Disparities 7.673 3.409*** 
H5 Founder Status → TMG Pay Disparities .910 2.269* 
H6 Number of Corporate Boards → TMG Pay Disparities -.103 -1.091 
H7 Elite Education → TMG Pay Disparities .138 .901 
H8a Discretion X CEO Duality → TMG Pay Disparities .125 .804 
H8b 
Discretion X Interdependent Directors → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
-.007 -.037 
H8c Discretion X CEO Tenure → TMG Pay Disparities -.032 -.144 
H8d 
Discretion X CEO Equity Shares → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
.141 .901 
H8e Discretion X Founder Status → TMG Pay Disparities X X 
H8f 
Discretion X Number of Corporate Boards → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
X X 
H8f Discretion X Elite Education → TMG Pay Disparities -.043 -.336 
H9a 
CEO Duality X TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.100 .727 
H9a 
CEO Duality X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) → 
TMG Pay Disparities 
-.036 -.241 
H9a 
CEO Duality X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
X X 
H9b 
CEO Tenure X TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.143 -.869 
H9b 
CEO Tenure X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) → 
TMG Pay Disparities 
.187 .926 
H9b 
CEO Tenure X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares Held) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
X X 
H9c 
Prop. Int. Dirs. TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.081 -.573 
H9c 
Prop. Int. Dirs. X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.073 .420 
H9c 
Prop. Int. Dirs. X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
.048 .325 
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H9d 
CEO Shares Held TMG Relative Power (Inside 
Directors) → TMG Pay Disparities 
.077 .514 
H9d 
CEO Shares Held X TMG Relative Power (Separate 
COO) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.132 -.903 
H9d 
CEO Shares Held X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
.098 .489 
H9e 
Founder Status TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.035 -.247 
H9e 
Founder Status X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.110 -.791 
H9e 
Founder Status X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.173 -1.006 
H9f 
Number of Corporate Boards X TMG Relative Power 
(Inside Directors) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.154 -1.108 
H9f 
Number of Corporate Boards X TMG Relative Power 
(Separate COO) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.412 -2.901** 
H9f 
Number of Corporate Boards X TMG Relative Power 
(TMG Shares Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
.885 5.407*** 
H9f 
Elite Education TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.058 .431 
H9f 
Elite Education X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.201 1.435 
H9f 
Elite Education X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
X X 
H10 
TMG Pay Disparities → Subsequent Financial 
Performance (Economic Perspective) 
.014 2.063* 
H11 
TMG Pay Disparities → Subsequent Financial 
Performance (Behavioral Perspective) 
X X 
H12 
TMG Pay Disparities (Quadratic)→ Subsequent 
Financial Performance 
-.122 -4.073***
H13 
TMG Pay Disparities X Industry Dynamism → 
Subsequent Financial Performance 
-.042 -1.333 
χ2=78.0; d.f.=34; p < .000; RMSEA = .044; CFI = .993; NNFI = .847 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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 The χ2 was significant (χ2=78.0; d.f.=34; p < .000). However, the ratio of χ2 to 
degrees of freedom was 2.29 which is less than the level (<3) that indicates satisfactory 
model fit (Carmines & McIver, 1981). Additionally, the RMSEA index (.0437) indicates 
excellent model fit as it falls below the .08 level, which signifies satisfactory model fit 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The CFI is .993, which also indicates excellent model fit as it 
is above the recommended .90 level (Kline, 1998). Lastly, the NNFI is .847, which fails 
to meet the .90 threshold for satisfactory model fit (Kline, 1998).  
 In observing the significance levels of the parameter estimates for hypothesized 
paths, several important results emerge. First, as was indicated by preliminary analyses 
using OLS regression, both measures of Ownership Power (Equity Shares Held - CEO 
and Founder Status) were statistically significant in predicting TMG Pay Disparities. 
Equity Shares held - CEO is significant at the p < .001 level with a t-value of 3.409. 
Founder Status is significant at the p < .05 level with a t-value of 2.269. Also notable is 
that Interdependent Directors was marginally non-significant at the p < .10 with a t-value 
of 1.637. Given these results, both hypotheses 4 and 5 received strong support in that the 
relationships are statistically significant with beta coefficients that are in the expected 
(positive) direction.  
Also of note is that two of measures of TMG Relative Power were highly 
significant when moderating the hypothesized relationship between External Boards and 
TMG Pay Disparities. Specifically, the presence of a Separate COO (t-value = -2.901; p < 
.01) served to mitigate the extent to which TMG Pay Disparities exist as a function of the 
number of External Boards (Prestige Power) that a CEO serves on. The sign of the beta 
coefficient is in the hypothesized direction (negative), which indicates support for 
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hypothesis 9f when Separate COO is used as a measure of TMG Relative Power. 
However, higher levels of Equity Shares Held – TMG served to increase the extent to 
which TMG Pay Disparities exist (t-value = 5.401; p < .001) as a function of the number 
of External Boards on which the CEO serves as the sign of the beta coefficient is 
positive.  This result runs counter to the logic of hypothesis 9f when Equity Shares Held 
– TMG is used as the measure of TMG Relative Power. 
The path model also provides support for two main hypotheses regarding the 
effect of TMG Pay Disparities on Subsequent Financial Performance. Specifically, as was 
supported by preliminary analyses using OLS regression the path model provides support 
for the economic perspective (Hypothesis 10) regarding the relationship between TMG 
Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance. The beta coefficient is positive 
with a t-value of 2.063 (p < .05). Additionally, and as was indicated by preliminary OLS 
regression analyses Hypothesis 12 is supported as the expected sign of the beta is 
negative, as predicted (indicative of a concave relationship), and highly significant (p < 
.001). However, unlike what was indicated in preliminary OLS regression analysis the 
hypothesized moderating effect of Coordination Needs on the TMG Pay Disparities and 
Subsequent Financial Performance relationship was non-significant. Of note is that 
reported results only apply to the accounting measure of performance (ROA). While 
testing the model using the market measure of performance (MTB) shows excellent 
model fit (see Table 5.5.2) an examination of the parameter estimates indicates that 
(while predicted relationships between Ownership Power/Relative TMG Power and TMG 
Pay Disparities are significant), there is no statistically significant relationship between 
TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance.  
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Table 5.5.2 Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit Indices of Modified Saturated 
Path Model When MTB is the Measure of Subsequent Financial Performance 
(N=604) 
 Path Estimate t-value 
H1 CEO Duality → TMG Pay Disparities -.090 -.309 
H2 Interdependent Directors → TMG Pay Disparities 1.518 1.736+ 
H3 CEO Tenure→ TMG Pay Disparities -.190 .-.812 
H4 CEO Equity Shares → TMG Pay Disparities 7.946 3.518*** 
H5 Founder Status → TMG Pay Disparities .905 2.258* 
H6 Number of Corporate Boards → TMG Pay Disparities -.108 -1.138 
H7 Elite Education → TMG Pay Disparities .155 1.006 
H8a 
Managerial Discretion X CEO Duality → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
.120 .770 
H8b 
Discretion X Interdependent Directors → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
.012 .063 
H8c Discretion X CEO Tenure → TMG Pay Disparities -.046 -.204 
H8d 
Discretion X CEO Equity Shares → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
.152 .967 
H8e Discretion X Founder Status → TMG Pay Disparities X X 
H8f 
Discretion X Number of Corporate Boards → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
X X 
H8f Discretion X Elite Education → TMG Pay Disparities -.048 -.380 
H9a 
CEO Duality X TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.096 .706 
H9a 
CEO Duality X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) → 
TMG Pay Disparities 
-.035 -.237 
H9a 
CEO Duality X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
X X 
H9b 
CEO Tenure X TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.205 -1.019 
H9b 
CEO Tenure X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) → 
TMG Pay Disparities 
.146 .889 
H9b 
CEO Tenure X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares Held) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
X X 
H9c 
Prop. Int. Dirs. TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.077 -.544 
H9c 
Prop. Int. Dirs. X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.059 .342 
H9c Prop. Int. Dirs. X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares .044 .297 
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Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
H9d 
CEO Shares Held TMG Relative Power (Inside 
Directors) → TMG Pay Disparities 
.071 .473 
H9d 
CEO Shares Held X TMG Relative Power (Separate 
COO) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.133 -.923 
H9d 
CEO Shares Held X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
.095 .473 
H9e 
Founder Status TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.043 -.303 
H9e 
Founder Status X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
-.121 -.868 
H9e 
Founder Status X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.176 -1.026 
H9f 
Number of Corporate Boards X TMG Relative Power 
(Inside Directors) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.149 -1.073 
H9f 
Number of Corporate Boards X TMG Relative Power 
(Separate COO) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.414 -2.927** 
H9f 
Number of Corporate Boards X TMG Relative Power 
(TMG Shares Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
.884 5.409*** 
H9f 
Elite Education TMG Relative Power (Inside Directors) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.062 .462 
H9f 
Elite Education X TMG Relative Power (Separate COO) 
→ TMG Pay Disparities 
.193 1.385 
H9f 
Elite Education X TMG Relative Power (TMG Shares 
Held) → TMG Pay Disparities 
X X 
H10 
TMG Pay Disparities → Subsequent Financial 
Performance (Economic Perspective) 
.023 .609 
H11 
TMG Pay Disparities → Subsequent Financial 
Performance (Behavioral Perspective) 
X X 
H12 
TMG Pay Disparities (Quadratic)→ Subsequent 
Financial Performance 
-.081 -.050 
H13 
TMG Pay Disparities X Industry Dynamism → 
Subsequent Financial Performance 
.084 .490 
χ2=51.5; d.f.=34; p < .028; RMSEA = .027; CFI = .997; NNFI = .941 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
The parameter estimates of the control variables for the model using ROA as the 
measure of Subsequent Financial Performance are reported in Table 5.5.3 while 
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parameter estimates of the control variables for the model using MTB are reported in 
Table 5.5.4. With the exception of expected CEO Age and Prior Financial Performance 
effects on TMG Pay Disparities, and Firm Size on Subsequent Financial Performance, 
control  variables were in the expected direction and statistically significant. 
Table 5.5.3 Parameter Estimates of Control Variables Included in Saturated Path 
Model When ROA is the Measure of Subsequent Financial Performance (N=604) 
Path Estimate t-value 
CEO Age → TMG Pay Disparities .182 .913 
Industry-relative Pay Level – CEO → TMG Pay Disparities 8.194 17.354***
Industry-relative Pay Level - TMG → TMG Pay Disparities -3.051 -5.595*** 
Firm Size → TMG Pay Disparities 5.916 6.407*** 
Tournament Size → TMG Pay Disparities -.840 -3.617*** 
Prior Financial Performance → TMG Pay Disparities -.013 -.227 
Firm Size → Subsequent Financial Performance -.156 -.859 
Prior Financial Performance → Subsequent Financial 
Performance 
.093 7.288*** 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Table 5.5.4 Parameter Estimates of Control Variables Included in Saturated Path 
Model When MTB is the Measure of Subsequent Financial Performance (N=604) 
Path Estimate t-value 
CEO Age → TMG Pay Disparities .168 .840 
Industry-relative Pay Level – CEO → TMG Pay Disparities 8.222 17.417***
Industry-relative Pay Level - TMG → TMG Pay Disparities -3.069 -5.636*** 
Firm Size → TMG Pay Disparities 5.936 6.490*** 
Tournament Size → TMG Pay Disparities -.833 -3.605*** 
Prior Financial Performance → TMG Pay Disparities -.026 -1.124 
Firm Size → Subsequent Financial Performance .270 .273 
Prior Financial Performance → Subsequent Financial 
Performance 
.585 20.199***
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
5.6 Modified Path Model 
One of the advantages of using a structured equation modeling software package 
(e.g. LISREL) to test a path model is that model development is aided by the provision of 
fit indices. Path models may be trimmed by removing non-significant paths from the 
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saturated model so as to identify, specify, and test a better fitting model. Evaluation of the 
parameter estimates in the modified saturated model suggested that several paths be 
removed. Specifically, all parameter estimates with t-values < 1.6 were removed on an 
iterative basis beginning with the lowest t-values.  
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Figure 5.6 Modified Theoretical Path Model 
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The modified theoretical path model is presented in Figure 5.6. Model fit indices 
and parameter estimates for hypothesized relationships are shown in Table 5.6.1.  
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Table 5.6.1 Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit Indices of Modified 
Theoretical Path Model When ROA is the Measure of Subsequent Financial 
Performance (N=604) 
Hypothesis Path Estimate t-value 
H2 
Interdependent Directors → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
1.124 1.736+ 
H4 CEO Equity Shares → TMG Pay Disparities 7.332 3.471*** 
H5 Founder Status → TMG Pay Disparities .820 2.109* 
H9f 
External Boards X TMG Relative Power 
(Separate COO) → TMG Pay Disparities 
-.301 -2.435** 
H10 
TMG Pay Disparities → Subsequent 
Financial Performance (Economic 
Perspective) 
.012 1.894+ 
H12 
TMG Pay Disparities (Quadratic)→ 
Subsequent Financial Performance 
-.113 -3.925***
χ2=98.3; d.f.=63; p < .003; RMSEA = .028; CFI = .995; NNFI = .934 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (1-tailed α) 
As was expected, the model improved in overall fit as is exemplified in the 
improvement of all fit indices. The χ2 was significant (χ2=98.3; d.f.=63; p < .003). 
However, the ratio of χ2 to degrees of freedom improved from 2.29 to 1.56 indicating 
improved model fit (Carmines & McIver, 1981). Additionally, the RMSEA index 
improved from .044 to .023 thereby indicating excellent model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 
1993). The CFI improved marginally by increasing from .993 to .995 (Kline, 1998). And, 
the NNFI improved dramatically from .847 to .934 thereby indicating radically improved 
model fit. More importantly, the NNFI exceeds the .90 threshold for satisfactory model 
fit in the modified theoretical model (Kline, 1998).  
Of note is that Hypotheses 4, 5, 9f, 10, and 12 are all supported as they were in 
the modified saturated model. Additionally, Hypothesis 2 (TMG Pay Disparities 
regressed onto Interdependent Directors) receives some support (p < .10) level with a 
moderate increase in the t-value from 1.637 to 1.736. Also of note is that the significance 
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level of the TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance relationship 
(Hypothesis 10) is significant at p < .10 (it was significant at p < .05 in the saturated 
model). Because the saturated model does not support the use of MTB as a measure of 
Subsequent Financial Performance in this model, the saturated MTB model was not 
modified. 
The parameter estimates of all significant control variables for the modified 
theoretical path model using ROA as the measure of Subsequent Financial Performance 
are reported in Table 5.6.2.  
Table 5.6.2 Parameter Estimates of Control Variables Included in Modified 
Theoretical Path Model When ROA is the Measure of Subsequent Financial 
Performance (N=604) 
Path Estimate t-value 
Industry-relative Pay Level – CEO → TMG Pay Disparities 8.184 17.687***
Industry-relative Pay Level - TMG → TMG Pay Disparities -2.900 -5.372*** 
Firm Size → TMG Pay Disparities 5.325 6.083*** 
Tournament Size → TMG Pay Disparities -.814 -3.597*** 
Prior Performance → Subsequent Financial Performance .094 7.416*** 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (1-tailed α) 
5.7 Summary of Hypothesis Testing  
 Table 5.7 presents the summary of hypothesis testing using both regression and 
the path analysis aspects of structured equation modeling in LISREL 8.72. In summary, 8 
of the 13 hypotheses developed in this study received, at least, some support in one of the 
two methods (OLS and SEM-Path Analysis) used to analyze the theoretical model. 
Hypotheses 4, 5, 9f (TMG Pay Disparities on Number of Boards and Separate COO), and 
12 received strong support irrespective of the method of analysis used. 
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Table 5.7 Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses OLS Regression Path Analysis 
H1: CEO Duality → TMG Pay Disparities Not Supported Not Supported 
H2: Interdependent Directors → TMG Pay 
Disparities 
Partially 
Supported 
Partially 
Supported 
H3: CEO Tenure→ TMG Pay Disparities Not Supported Not Supported 
H4: CEO Equity Shares → TMG Pay Disparities Supported Supported 
H5: Founder Status → TMG Pay Disparities Supported Supported 
H6: External Boarsd → TMG Pay Disparities Not Supported Not Supported 
H7: Elite Education → TMG Pay Disparities Not Supported Not Supported 
H8: Managerial Discretion X CEO Power → 
TMG Pay Disparities 
Partially 
Supported  
(8d only) 
Not Supported 
H9: TMG Relative Power X CEO Power → 
TMG Pay Disparities 
Supported  
(9f Only) 
Supported 
(9f Only) 
H10: TMG Pay Disparities → Subsequent 
Financial Performance (Economic Perspective) 
Partially 
Supported Supported 
H11: TMG Pay Disparities → Subsequent 
Financial Performance (Behavioral Perspective) 
Not Supported Not Supported 
H12: TMG Pay Disparities (Quadratic)→ 
Subsequent Financial Performance 
Supported Supported 
H13: TMG Pay Disparities X Industry 
Dynamism → Subsequent Financial 
Performance 
Partially 
Supported Not Supported 
 
Further, the squared multiple correlations are .581 and .117 for TMG Pay 
Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance (ROA), respectively. Hence, the 
amount of variance of TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance 
(ROA) explained by the model is 41.9% (1-.581) and 88.3% (1-.117), respectively. 
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5.8 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
 In addition to the preliminary analyses of the theoretical model using path 
analysis, secondary analyses was done in order to ascertain the multidimensional nature 
of CEO power. Specifically, as is shown in Figure 5.8.1, it was argued in chapter 3 that 
CEO Duality, Interdependent Directors, and CEO Tenure would be representative of a 
CEO’s structural power. Further, Equity Shares Held – CEO and Founder Status were 
argued to be representative of the power that emanates from ownership. And, External 
Boards and Elite Education were posited to be representative of the power that results as 
a function of the CEO’s social or prestige power.  
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Figure 5.8.1 Confirmatory Factor Model 
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The parameter estimates of the measured confirmatory factor model are reported 
in Figure 5.8.2.  
Figure 5.8.2 Confirmatory Factor Model – Measured 
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Individual measures of power were all statistically significant while factors loaded 
onto the individual measures of power as expected. Specifically, CEO Duality (t = 9.251; 
p < .001), Interdependent Directors (t = 20.830; p < .001), and CEO Tenure (t = 15.772; p 
< .001) all loaded onto Structural Power as expected. Equity Shares Held – CEO (t = 
9.643; p < .001) and Founder Status (t = 10.337; p < .001) loaded onto Ownership Power 
as expected And, External Boards (t = 4.9.635; p < .001) and Elite Education (t = 9.635; 
p < .001) loaded onto Prestige Power as expected.  
 Additionally, fit indices all indicate that the structural model is a good fit with the 
data. The χ2 was significant at 29.9 with 12 degrees (p < .003). The ratio of χ2 to degrees 
of freedom was 2.49, which is less than 3-the level that indicates a satisfactory model fit 
(Carmines & McIver, 1981). The RMSEA index of model fit (.050) was below.08 
indicating good model fit. The CFI was .974. The NFI was .957, and the NNFI was .954. 
5.9 Latent Regression 
In addition to the preliminary analyses of the theoretical model using path 
analysis, and secondary analyses designed to ascertain the multidimensional nature of 
CEO power, a tertiary analysis was conducted in order to test the theoretical path model 
using the latent CEO Power constructs in a latent regression model. Specifically, as is 
shown in Figure 5.9.1, it was expected that each of the three latent constructs identified 
through confirmatory factor analysis would act as antecedents of TMG Pay Disparities in 
addition to the moderators and covariates identified in the path analysis. Further, as was 
shown using path analysis it was expected that TMG Pay Disparities would affect 
Subsequent Financial Performance. The measured latent regression model described 
herein is presented in Figure 5.9.1. 
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Figure 5.9.1 Latent Regression Model  
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Results indicate that only one of the latent CEO Power constructs had a 
statistically significant relationship with TMG Pay Disparities. Specifically, while 
Structural Power and Prestige Power were both non-significant, Ownership Power was 
significant at the p < .001 level (t-value = 3.607). Also, of interest is that the relationship 
between TMG pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance got stronger with a 
linear effect of .052 at the p < .01 (t-value = 2.056) level and a non-monotonic effect of -
.178 at the p < .001 (t-value = -4.164). Further, the moderating effect of Industry 
Dynamism on the TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance 
relationship was significant at the p < .10 (t-value = -1.773). Additionally, all covariates 
remained significant in the latent model. See Table 5.9.1. for details.   
Table 5.9.1 Parameter Estimates of Control Variables Included in the Latent 
Regression Model When ROA is the Measure of Subsequent Financial Performance 
(N=604) 
Path Estimate t-value 
Industry-relative Pay Level – CEO → TMG Pay Disparities 3.091 17.981***
Industry-relative Pay Level - TMG → TMG Pay Disparities -1.078 -6.378*** 
Firm Size → TMG Pay Disparities 1.898 7.096*** 
Tournament Size → TMG Pay Disparities -.224 -3.215*** 
Prior Performance → Subsequent Financial Performance .133 7.196*** 
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (1-tailed α) 
 Although the results mimic those found using path analysis, overall model fit is 
poor. Specifically, χ2 was significant at 443.7 with 112 degrees (p < .0). The ratio of χ2 to 
degrees of freedom was 3.96, which exceeds the level that indicates a satisfactory model 
fit (Carmines & McIver, 1981). While the RMSEA index of model fit (.071) was 
adequate, the CFI (.878), NFI (.845), and NNFI (.833) all indicated overall poor model 
fit.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of this study was to develop and empirically test a 
theoretical model that associates CEO power, the relative power of other (non-CEO) 
members of the TMG, and managerial discretion with TMG pay disparities, and TMG pay 
disparities with subsequent financial performance. This study was motivated by the desire 
to contribute to the evolving body of research regarding TMG pay disparities by 
addressing three important, but previously unaddressed questions. First, the study was 
conducted in order to determine the extent to which sociopolitical factors influence the 
extent to which TMG pay disparities exist within large, publicly-traded corporations. 
Specifically, my theoretical model focused empirical attention on the roles that CEO 
power and the relative power of other (non-CEO) members of the TMG play. Second, the 
theoretical model hypothesized that the amount of discretion conveyed by the firm 
environment would serve to moderate the hypothesized CEO power/TMG pay disparities 
relationship. Lastly, I sought to clarify the relationship between TMG pay disparities and 
subsequent financial performance.  
Several important findings emerge from this study. First, results indicate that 
multiple sources of CEO power affect the extent to which pay disparities exist within 
TMGs. Second, results from the study also demonstrate that some sources of the relative 
power of non-CEO TMG members do, in fact, serve to mitigate the extent to which the 
CEO may consume a disproportionate share of the TMG’s compensation resources. 
Additionally, the results indicate that the TMG pay disparities/subsequent financial 
performance relationship is best explained when the economic and behavioral 
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perspectives are integrated as was developed in chapter 3. Results will be discussed in the 
subsequent sections.  
6.1 CEO Power and TMG Pay Disparities 
 Based on existing theory (e.g. tournament theory, managerial power, CEO 
compensation, governance, etc.), I hypothesized that multiple sources of CEO power (in 
year t-2) would be positively associated with the extent to which pay is disparate within 
TMGs (in year t-1). The predicted relationships were based on the argument that while the 
capacity to “realize one’s own will even over the resistance of others” (Weber, 1946: 
180), is necessary for CEOs to formulate, negotiate, and implement strategies (Eisenhardt 
& Burgeois, 1988) such power may be seen as a double-edged sword. In the context of 
sequential elimination tournaments and TMG pay disparities, it was argued that powerful 
CEOs can limit the extent to which potential rivals in corporate tournaments may serve to 
mitigate their capacity to consume a disproportionate share of the TMG’s compensation 
resources thereby serving to increase TMG pay disparities. In terms of the extent to which 
TMG pay disparities exist within TMGs as a function of the power held by the incumbent 
CEO, several sources of CEO power played an important role. 
While never tested in the context of TMG pay disparities, the findings regarding 
the relationship between the proportion of equity shares held by the CEO and TMG pay 
disparities is consistent with the extant managerialism and CEO compensation research, 
which indicates that power accrues to CEOs who maintain substantial ownership 
positions in their firms to the extent that such CEOs are able to effect how compensation 
resources are allocated more so than are CEOs who lack such an ownership stake (e.g. 
Daily & Johnson, 1997). Additionally, results are consistent with empirical studies that 
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demonstrate that powerful CEOs (as a function equity shares held) are able to enjoy the 
privileges (e.g. higher levels of compensation) associated with relatively high levels of 
power (Finklestein & Hambrick, 1989). In as much, the results of this study indicate that 
CEOs with higher levels of the ownership power that are attributed to relatively high 
levels of equity shares are able to consume larger proportions of firm compensation 
resources in relation to other members of the TMG.  
Ownership power was also theorized to accrue to incumbent CEOs as a function 
of being either the founder or a member of the founding family. While never tested in the 
context of TMG pay disparities, the extent to which founders are able to gain power 
through their long-term interaction with the board in ways that translate into the capacity 
to enjoy the privileges associated with such status (Finkelstein, 1992). For example, 
research has shown that status as founder results in the capacity to remain in office due to 
lower rates of succession (McEachern, 1975: Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio, 1999). Results of this 
study are consistent with this logic in that CEOs who are also the founders of their firm 
(or members of the founding family) are able to consume larger proportions of firm 
compensation resources in relation to other members of the TMG. 
As a source of structural power, the proportion of interdependent directors 
appointed to the board by the incumbent CEO also served to increase the extent to which 
TMG pay disparities exist within large, publicly-traded companies. The proportion of 
interdependent directors has been shown to serve as an important source of 
institutionalized structural power in that the achievement of the agendas of incumbent 
CEOs may be facilitated by the presence of directors who feel loyalty to the CEO for 
their appointments (e.g. Boeker, 1992). While no empirical consensus exists regarding 
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the influence of interdependent directors, the results of this study support the notion that 
interdependent directors enhance a CEO’s power to the extent that they may consume 
larger proportions of firm compensation resources in relation to other members of the 
TMG. 
This study failed to find support for several hypothesized relationships. 
Specifically, none of the following characteristics was associated with TMG pay 
disparities: 1) whether the incumbent CEO also acted as Board Chairperson; 2) the 
amount of time in the position; 3) the CEO’s educational background; and, 4) the number 
of external corporate boards on which the CEO served.  
Based on arguments developed in the corporate governance and managerial power 
literatures, it was argued that acting as Board Chairperson would allow the incumbent 
CEO to centralize the combined structural power associated with both the CEO and 
Board Chairperson roles to the extent that the resulting power would facilitate the 
consumption of greater proportions of the TMG’s compensation resources. Results may 
be non-significant for two possible reasons. First, while dual CEOs have been found to 
achieve higher relative power than non-dual CEOs, many of the studies in which such 
power was observed were conducted in the governance studies of the 1980s, 1990s, and 
in the early part of this decade (e.g. Daily & Johnson, 1997; Pollock, & Fisher, 2002; 
Rechner & Dalton, 1991). The temporal specification of this context is important because 
the effectiveness of the corporate governance structures changed in the years subsequent 
to the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. For example, it has been shown that 
post-SOX boards are larger and more independent than they were prior to this period 
(Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2007). In as much, it may be that such boards have become 
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increasingly effective in monitoring dual CEOs in ways that mitigate the potential for 
agency problems.  
Based on arguments developed in the top manager characteristics, corporate 
governance, and managerial power literatures, it was argued that the number of years a 
CEO is in office would serve as a significant source of power. Specifically, long tenure 
was expected to result in the capacity to institutionalize the structural power of the 
position in a way that would facilitate entrenchment because institutionalized power 
would allow incumbent CEOs to nominate new board members who subsequently feel a 
sense of loyalty to the nominating CEO and to gain control over the information that is 
made available to both members of the board and other members of the TMG (e.g. 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). However, what is of note in this study is that the average 
tenure of the CEOs in this sample is only 6 years while the range of CEOs who fall 
within one standard deviation is 3.7-8.3 years. Hence, the non-significant findings may be 
an artifact of the distributional characteristics of the sample and the influence of its 
institutional context in which institutional changes in the regulatory environment may 
have resulted in greater turnover and shorter tenure of the CEOs of large, publicly-traded 
firms.  
Based on arguments developed in the top manager characteristics and managerial 
power literatures, it was argued that incumbent CEOs may be more likely to limit 
challenges to their position and power as a result of their membership in the corporate 
elite. CEOs were argued to acquire prestige from the capacity to convey images of 
competence as a function of having an elite educational background (D’Aveni, 1990; 
Finkelstein, 1992). Although little empirical research has been done in this area, Daily & 
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Johnson (1997) showed that CEOs with prestigious educational backgrounds are granted 
relatively wide discretion within firms as a result of the image of control. In the context 
of TMG pay disparities, the results of this study do not indicate that such power is 
associated with the capacity to consume relatively more compensation vis-à-vis the other 
members of the TMG. This non-significant finding may be due to the likelihood that 
multiple members of the corporate elite (e.g. the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating 
Officer, etc.) have similar educational backgrounds. In fact, given the extent to which the 
TMG is considered to act as a dominant coalition with the CEO as the focal figure it is 
likely that the preeminent member of this coalition hires other executives that have 
similar educational backgrounds (Schneider, 1987). It may also be that this non-
significant finding is a function of the distributional characteristics of this variable. 
Specifically, more than half (n=314 or 52%) of the CEOs in this sample have a college 
degree that is not earned at an elite institution. Hence, there may be a restriction of range 
issue that confounds analyses using this measure of elite education. 
In that membership in the corporate elite also results from serving on external 
corporate boards as an outside director, it was argued that acting in the capacity of 
director on the board of other social organizations or institutions increases the capacity to 
form interorganizational linkages and interpersonal affiliations with corporate elites that 
serve to bolster the incumbent CEO’s image among peers and potential rivals. The 
capacity to project the power that emanates from membership in this network was argued 
to deflect challenges to the incumbent’s position and resulting power, and to allow for the 
consumption of disproportionate shares of the TMG’s compensation resources. The 
results of this study did not support this logic. Statistical non-findings may result for two 
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related reasons. First, one of the foci of changes in the corporate governance environment 
resulting from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) was to facilitate greater board 
independence by increasing director workload and risk (Linck et al., 2007). For instance, 
audit committees were found to meet twice as often post-SOX than they did pre-SOX 
while Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums more than doubled (Linck et al., 
2007). The extent to which boards are more independent and active may serve to dampen 
the extent to which incumbent CEOs may project the power associated with having 
powerful friends internally. Another possibility is that, in a post-SOX world, the CEOs of 
large-publicly-traded companies had fewer opportunities (and desire due to higher risk) 
to act as outside directors on the boards of peer firms. For instance, 71% of the CEOs in 
this sample served on 1 external corporate boards while nearly 84% served on 2 or fewer 
external boards.  
6.2 The Role of Managerial Discretion 
The managerial discretion literature posits that managers are provided with a 
greater capacity to shape the course of the organization in certain situations (e.g. Child, 
1972; Finklestein & Boyd, 1998; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Based on this logic I 
argued that in firm-level environments characterized by relatively high levels of 
discretion powerful CEOs would better have the capacity to consume a greater portion of 
the TMG’s compensation resources. As a result, I expected that TMG pay disparities 
would be greater when powerful CEOs have the latitude to shape TMG compensation 
policies in firms characterized by greater discretion.  
The results of this study partially support this line of reasoning in that discretion 
allows that CEOs who enjoy founder status (a measure of ownership power) are able to 
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consume greater pay vis-à-vis the other members of the TMG. While this result obtains, 
discretion does not moderate the relationship between TMG pay disparities and any other 
measure of CEO power. One explanation is that managerial discretion is conceptualized 
and operationalized solely at the firm-level. It is possible that this level of analysis does 
not capture the extent to which the “environment” conveys latitude. While discretion 
within the firm is thought to effect the degree to which the organization empowers the 
CEO to formulate and execute a variety of actions, it may be at the level of the industry 
that variety and change is effected (Boyd & Gove, 2007). In this sense, it is possible that 
explaining the variance in TMG pay disparities is best done when viewing managerial 
discretion as an element of the industry, or as a combination of the firm and the industry 
rather than solely as an element of the firm.   
6.3 The Role of the Relative Power of the TMG  
Based on arguments inherent in tournament and circulation of power theories (e.g. 
Ocasio, 1994; Rosen, 1986), I argued that the non-CEO members of the TMG may 
become rivals to the incumbent CEO as a function of the incentive mechanisms inherent 
in sequential elimination tournaments. Specifically, interest conflicts and competition 
among members of the TMG was thought to be born from the desire of other TMG 
members to ascend to the office of the CEO and to attain the associated power and 
privileges (Pfeffer, 1981; Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002). In as much it was expected that, if 
relatively powerful in their own rights, potential rivals would be able to mitigate a 
powerful incumbent CEO’s capacity to consume a disproportionate share of the TMG’s 
compensation resources.  
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Several proxies (the proportion of insiders on the board, the proportion of shares 
held by the TMG, and the presence of a separate COO) of relative TMG power were used 
as moderators of the individual measures of TMG pay disparities. Among the many 
relationships tested, only Prestige Power (the number of external boards on which the 
incumbent CEO serves) is affected by the relative power of other members of the TMG. 
As was expected, and as is consistent with extant empirical work (Zhang, 2006), the 
presence of a separate COO served to limit the extent to which CEOs with prestige power 
might extract disproportionate pay. It is possible that this finding is indicative of CEOs 
being somewhat less present in their “home” firms when they participate on a number of 
external corporate boards to the extent that a competent, and highly paid, COO serves 
(somewhat) as a surrogate.  
On the other hand, the proportion of shares held by the non-CEO TMG members 
had a very strong and positive effect on TMG pay disparities. This result is counter to 
extant theory (Shen & Cannella, 2002) and the theory developed in chapter 3. For 
example, Shen & Cannella, Jr. (2002) found that the equity ownership of non-CEO 
members of the TMG was positively linked with CEO dismissal followed by inside 
succession although it was not related to CEO dismissal followed by outside succession. 
Findings in this study may indicate that non-CEO TMG members may be paid largely in 
the way of long-term equity rather than with short-term compensation.  
6.4 TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent Financial Performance 
 Based on the economic and behavioral perspectives of TMG pay disparities 
discussed in chapter 3, I developed competing hypotheses that predicted (1) that TMG 
pay disparities (in year t-2) would lead to better subsequent financial performance 
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(economic perspective) in year t-1, or (2) that TMG pay disparities (in year t-2) would lead 
to worse subsequent financial performance (behavioral perspective) in year t-1. In terms 
of the economic perspective, the predicted relationship was based on the argument that 
performance-related benefits would accrue to firms as a function of wider TMG pay 
disparities. The argument holds that disparities in pay within the TMG will serve to 
motivate higher levels of individual performance among tournament participants that 
result in the most qualified (or competitive) individual among them achieving the CEO’s 
job. Further, it is argued that such competition results in higher levels of subsequent 
organizational performance.  
On the other hand, and with respect to the behavioral perspective, it was argued 
that relatively large disparities in pay within the TMG would result in a reduced capacity 
of the TMG to function as a cohesive unit with coordinated action because cognitive 
dissonance regarding disparities in pay would lead to perceptions of inequity and 
injustice regarding the rewards structure. Consistent with results supporting the economic 
perspective of TMG pay disparities, results of this study indicate that, at relatively low 
levels of TMG pay disparities, subsequent firm performance increases as a result of the 
higher levels of individual performance that results from the vigorous competition 
associated with the use of sequential elimination tournaments.  
However, based on the logic that an optimal level of individual competition for 
the top job would result in higher levels of organizational performance, I argued that 
benefits to subsequent performance would obtain only to the point that such competition 
would result in the cognitive dissonance, feelings of injustice, and political behavior that 
would result from excessively high levels of pay disparities within the TMG. In as much, 
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Hypothesis 12 integrates both the economic and behavioral perspectives of TMG pay 
disparities. Although never tested in the context of TMG pay disparities, results strongly 
support such theoretical integration and indicate that TMG pay disparities is both 
beneficial and deleterious to subsequent financial performance depending on the extent to 
which their presence breeds individual competition among potential rivals in the TMG. 
 Of particular interest is that the relationship between TMG pay disparities and 
subsequent financial performance held only when ROA was used as a measure of 
performance. This insight may suggest two things: (1) that the sociopolitical effects of 
TMG pay disparities impact only the operational capabilities of the firm; and, (2) that 
capital market stakeholders may not have the opportunity to observe the performance-
related (sociopolitical) effects of TMG pay disparities. This is an empirical question that 
should be evaluated in subsequent research. 
6.5 The Role of Coordination Needs 
Based on the arguments developed in the industry dynamism (e.g. Boyd & Gove, 
2007; Dess & Beard, 1984; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) and coordination needs (e.g. 
(Siegel & Hambrick, 2005; Thompson, 1967) literatures, it was argued that the effects of 
relatively disparate pay within TMGs would be deleterious to subsequent financial 
performance. The argument was based on the notion that TMGs who operate in industry 
environments are more required to collaborate, cooperate, and to coordinate their 
activities in order to achieve peak “team” and organizational and performance. To the 
extent that pay is disparate within TMGs in industry environments that are characterized 
by relatively high levels of uncertainty and volatility, it was expected that subsequent 
financial performance would suffer. Although support is weak, results are entirely 
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consistent with this line of reasoning in that TMG pay disparities worsen subsequent 
financial performance in industries that are characterized by volatility.  
6.6 Multidimensionality of CEO Power 
Results of this study support those originally shown by Finkelstein (1992). 
Specifically, the confirmatory factor analysis indicates that CEO power is, indeed, 
multidimensional. Further, CEO Power may be modeled as a latent factor that is 
comprised of 3 unique dimensions: Structural, Ownership, and Prestige. Results also 
indicate that Structural Power is accurately represented by CEO Duality, Interdependent 
Directors, and CEO Tenure, that Ownership Power is represented by Equity Shares Held 
– CEO and Founder Status, and that Prestige Power is represented by External Boards 
and Elite Education represent Prestige Power.  
Although the confirmatory factor analysis identifies the nature of CEO Power as 
multidimensional, among the previously identified latent factors only Ownership Power 
appears to be linked with TMG Pay Disparities. This finding echoes those emanating 
from both preliminary regression analyses and path analysis. It should also be noted that 
the latent model did not adequately fit the data as is indicated by relatively poor fit 
indices. One of the primary causes of the relatively poor fit may be that many of the 
measures are under-identified (specifically, TMG Pay Disparities and Subsequent 
Financial Performance) in that they were single-indicated. In as much, one of the primary 
benefits (correction for measurement error) of using structured equation modeling could 
not be achieved.  
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6.7 Theoretical Implications 
The findings of this study have important theoretical implications in terms of both 
the antecedents and performance-related implications of financial performance. First, 
evidence shows that the extent to which pay is disparate within TMGs is more than a 
function of the presence of sequential elimination tournaments. Specifically, the 
distribution of both short-and long-term pay appears to be, at least, partially a function of 
the manner in which power is distributed across TMG members. This research suggests 
that powerful CEOs use their power (specifically, power associated with ownership and 
location in the structural hierarchy) to consume a disproportionate share of the TMG’s 
compensation resources. This research also suggests that powerful CEOs may be able to 
do so without constraint and irrespective of the amount of discretion conveyed by the 
firm environment. It seems that the presence of a separate COO is the only factor that 
appears to mitigate this capacity (but, only in cases where the incumbent CEO 
participates on a number of external corporate boards). Hence, empirical investigation of 
the antecedents of TMG pay disparities should account for the contextual effect of 
distributions of power within the TMG as it appears that sociopolitical factors that are 
somewhat deterministic in how rewards are distributed.  
Another important implication of this study regards the extent to which TMG pay 
disparities affect subsequent financial performance. Findings indicate that both the 
economic and behavioral perspectives have some merit in explaining the relationship 
between TMG pay disparities and subsequent financial performance. That is, while 
individual competition seems to yield performance enhancements for the firm, this 
benefit is limited by the extent to which excessive individual competition may be 
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deleterious to subsequent financial performance. The evolution of theory should address 
the interplay of the economic and behavioral perspectives in identifying an optimal level 
of TMG pay disparities vis-à-vis subsequent financial performance. Findings also suggest 
that there may be some industry-specific effects. Specifically, theory should evolve to 
incorporate specification of industry effects in the evaluation of the TMG pay 
disparities/financial performance relationship.  
6.8 Practical Implications 
 In addition to theoretical implications, the findings have important implications 
for practice. First, the results of this study indicate that powerful CEOs (specifically, 
those with relatively high equity share ownership and who enjoy founder status) are able 
to consume disproportionate shares of the TMG’s compensation resources irrespective of 
the incentive mechanisms associated with the internal competition of corporate 
tournaments. In this sense, it appears that such CEOs may act in ways that ensure that 
rewards are allocated on bases that are not entirely legitimate (e.g. marginal utility).  
While interesting, this finding has implications for the firm’s financial 
performance. Specifically, after accounting for the effects of past performance and 
industry effects, it appears that the extent to which members of the TMG are paid as 
individuals (rather than collectively as a team) has real economic benefits/costs 
depending on the extent to which TMG pay is disparate.  
The implications identified herein are important for compensation policy-makers 
and stakeholders in the governance context. For example, findings indicate that power 
within the TMG must be balanced to the extent that one powerful individual cannot direct 
the compensation policy to the exclusion of the benefit of others. Findings also suggest 
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that compensation should be devised so as to ensure that members of the TMG are paid as 
a collective so as to facilitate greater cohesion and coordinated action while incorporating 
the benefits of individual incentives that facilitate performance-enhancing individual 
competition.  
6.9 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 As is the case with all empirical studies, this study is not without its limitations. 
The following limitations should be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the 
findings presented herein. First, as the sample was drawn from S&P 1500, the context of 
the study was confined to relatively large, publicly-traded companies that are domiciled 
in the United States. In as much, external validity is limited. Generalizing findings to 
relatively small, privately held firms, or firms domiciled in other countries should be 
done with extreme care and only in an effort to inform the development of research 
questions specific to those contexts. Second, while the sample was constructed using time 
lags in order to allow for causal inference, the data is not purely longitudinal. In as much, 
the relationships that have been explicated statistically inform us as to how the constructs 
studied herein relate, and not whether they are stable over time. Last, proxies are used to 
assess a number of sociopolitical processes. While the use of proxies is valid in the 
studies of top managers (e.g. Finkelstein, 1992) they do not allow for a direct test of the 
constructs in question.  
 This study points to several meaningful avenues for future research. First, it opens 
up the question of the study of TMG pay disparities to a theoretical approach that moves 
the field beyond tournament theory explanations. Specifically, it suggests that researchers 
may benefit from using a multi-theoretic approach. The use of theories regarding 
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managerial power and behavioral agency (e.g. Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) may 
inform the literature of the antecedents of TMG pay disparities in a more comprehensive 
and nuanced fashion. Additionally, findings also suggest that performance implications 
not only obtain, but that the effects of TMG pay disparities on performance are complex 
and somewhat specific to industry context. In as much, future research would benefit 
from evolving out of the either/or dichotomy between proponents of economic and 
behavioral perspectives to an integrated approach that recognizes the importance of both 
in advancing knowledge regarding the impact of this important phenomena on financial 
performance. Studies also echo the findings of previous research in that industry context 
seems to moderate the TMG pay disparities/subsequent financial performance 
relationship.  
6.10 Contributions and Conclusions 
 The primary objective of this dissertation was to contribute to the evolving TMG 
pay disparities literature by developing insights into the causes and effects of this 
important phenomenon. Drawing on the managerial power, managerial discretion, 
governance, and equity literatures, this study investigated the role that TMG power (and, 
CEO power specifically) plays in the extent to which TMG pay is disparate. It also 
addressed questions regarding the effect that TMG pay disparities have on subsequent 
financial performance. By empirically examining a theoretical model that was developed 
in order to link CEO power, the relative power of other TMG members, and managerial 
discretion to TMG pay disparities, and TMG pay disparities to subsequent financial 
performance, this study makes some important contributions to the TMG pay disparities, 
managerial power, and compensation literatures.  
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 First, this study extended the work of several scholars working in the evolving 
TMG pay disparities tradition (e.g. Bloom and Michel, 2002; Conyon et al., 2001; 
Hendrickson & Fredrickson, 2001; Lambert et al., 1993; Seigel & Hambrick, 2005) by 
addressing the sociopolitical factors that lead to the presence of disparate pay within 
TMGs. In this study I developed a framework that is based largely on the role that CEO 
power plays in the extent to which TMG pay disparities exist. In doing so, it went beyond 
tournament theoretic explanations of the presence of disparate pay by incorporating a 
sociopolitical perspective. Doing so shines a light on how the distribution of power 
affects how rewards are distributed within the dominant coalition. Not only do findings 
support the use of a sociopolitical perspective in the study of TMG pay disparities, they 
also suggest that TMG pay disparities exist, partially, as a function of elements in the 
corporate governance context (e.g. CEO equity ownership). Additionally, findings 
suggest that any attempt to explain the performance consequences of TMG pay disparities 
should adopt an integrated approach that focuses on the interplay of economic and 
behavioral perspectives in tests of nonmonotonic relationships with financial 
performance.  
 In addition to extending the work on TMG pay disparities, this work suggests that 
researchers in strategic management and organization theory would be well-served to 
focus empirical efforts on the sources and implications of CEO power. Specifically, while 
this study indicates that CEO power emanates from multiple sources individually, it also 
suggests that such power may be used to pursue individual objectives irrespective of the 
amount of latitude conveyed by the firm environment or the constraints posed by 
potential rivals within the firm. In as much, it suggests that, when they are so motivated 
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to do so, powerful CEOs may act without constraint: an issue that may be addressed in 
the context of corporate governance.  
 Finally, this study makes an important contribution to the CEO/TMG 
compensation literature in that it indicates that firms tend to do better when their rewards’ 
systems both (1) motivate competition among members of the TMG, and (2) recognize 
that, in excess, such competition may be deleterious to organizational performance. In as 
much, compensation policies should be devised in order to both facilitate competition 
while recognizing the need for motivating cohesive team play and coordinated action 
irrespective of industry context.  
 Overall, this dissertation presented some interesting new insights into the 
antecedents and consequences of TMG pay disparities. While the study provides answers 
to a number of theoretically and empirically interesting questions, it should also motivate 
inquiry designed to address unresolved issues in this evolving stream of research.  
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